Sneaky 2FA
- Technique
- Credential phishing
- Sub-technique
- AitM
- Targeted platforms
- Microsoft
- Also tracked as
- Sneaky LogWikiKit
Updated · First published
Current breakthrough rate
Moderate
- Mar 2026: High
- Apr 2026: Extreme
- May 2026: High
- Jun 2026: Extreme
- Jul 2026: High
- Aug 2026: Extreme
- Sep 2026: Moderate
Sneaky 2FA is an adversary-in-the-middle phishing-as-a-service kit targeting Microsoft 365 accounts, first observed in late 2024 and also tracked as Sneaky Log and WikiKit. Randomized URL structures and honeypot form fields keep it ahead of automated scanners, and it has been one of the most consistently detected tools in the browser since Push began tracking it.
URL patterns
The Sneaky 2FA family of phishing kits has evolved and possibly forked since its emergence in late 2024.
The earliest versions had distinctive paths containing a segement of 150 random alphanumeric characters
followed by /index or /verify:
/[a-zA-Z0-9]{150}/index- Blank page that simply redirects to/verifyusing JavaScript./[a-zA-Z0-9]{150}/verify- Fake Microsoft login form.
Starting in April 2025, further obfuscation was added to the URLs by randomizing the /verify path segment
as well as randomizing the length of the large alphanumeric segment. For example, a /verify URL was now
accessed using a path such as:
/QxJhREchBx4hjgckrIPkBit6besHMCKSo20supU8gXXT7efkYG3Iyr26A9dE9nnRMr5XsZL8JuAnmaovCRAqbpFVyWNDwfKWoZoOjod8iiqBmJHyvQSC62Nwtjmg5OU443oaEGFv3lOtwecGVTzL5xDlMNVZ97Pzl7dUWF1/m82scyq1KOFa
By late 2025, a variant had appeared that prepended the long random token with mixed case shorthand referencing
various Microsoft products - for example Ms36-DoC-..., AzRe-sHaRe-..., OuTl-DoWnLoAd-... and ExCl-PrEvIeW-....
These URLs also randomised the /index path segment:
/TeMs-ViEw-kopXHsYcSep_ZEnh09BdhviGsdlrlQN668vpHNghwd96LDsMKhqUKzfmLGwR7vo7ffItrMK4vTkPWVVsGeQL1uegBSFROt-FSP2i6Q4QbHd6Bys9sEsTRbFA2n6J2b4qztag6JEmrs_R7n8L6pPKNF9TXk3N-XemEclqw95V6ZYJCYAQt4Q7qnaCFfjb0r4xxLmVaMQuZFG/2TjgfU4HQdDZF
Over the course of 2026, this became the dominant URL structure observed by Push for detections associated with the Sneaky 2FA family.
Network traffic
The background traffic sent by Sneaky 2FA during credential relay has used a consistent base set of parameters
that are POSTed to the /validate endpoint (randomised since mid-2025). The example below shows three different
POST bodies for the three main steps:
- Email address validation
- Password submission
- Second factor authentication
POST /OuTl-DoWnLoAd-...dvWCr9/dfYA9ZWlUIW
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
em=<email>&security_token=<hex>×tamp=<ts>&email_hp=&username_hp=&password_hp=
em=<email>&pa=<password>&security_token=<hex>×tamp=<ts>&email_hp=&username_hp=&password_hp=
em=<email>&auth=verify_code&code=<otp>&security_token=<hex>×tamp=<ts>&email_hp=&username_hp=&password_hp=
The 2FA step auth value is typically one of verify_code (OTP), verify_sms (SMS) or verify_app (push).
The email_hp / username_hp / password_hp fields appear to be honeypots for bot detection.
Representative samples
Sample URLs
hxxp://compteltdcyberslmsiteservicespteltd[.]vu/
urlscanhxxps://amkortechnologynetworkscapital[.]monilyis[.]cfd/
urlscanhxxps://www[.]morravey[.]sustainabilitysow[.]com/
urlscanhxxps://securelogon-documentssignature-aspx16272[.]scanlonchiro[.]com/
urlscanhxxps://securedthirdwaysearch[.]com/
urlscanhxxps://mikeandannez[.]com/
urlscanhxxps://florenceorganics[.]us/bdbd/
urlscan
Public analysis
Third-party research on this tool.