Stop account takeover

Defense at multiple points in the attack chain: detect phishing before credentials or sessions are stolen, identify compromised credentials before they're exploited, and detect session replay when stolen tokens are used. No single control covers all ATO vectors.

Push addresses all three layers: behavioral phishing detection, compromised credential detection at login, and session marker injection for stolen token replay.

Unauthorized access to a user's account through stolen credentials, hijacked sessions, or compromised authentication. The attacker gains access as the legitimate user. ATO is the outcome; phishing, credential stuffing, and session hijacking are the methods.

ATO is difficult to detect with traditional tools — there's no malware, no exploit, no suspicious process. Push detects ATO at the attack stage rather than after the attacker is already inside.

Most organizations rely on email security (catching phishing lures), MFA (blocking credential replay), and IdP anomaly detection (flagging suspicious logins after the fact). Each covers part of the problem: email security misses non-email phishing channels, MFA is bypassed by AiTM and session hijacking, and IdP anomaly detection is post-compromise and defeated by residential proxies.

Effective ATO prevention requires layered detection: phishing detection (catching the attack before credentials are stolen), credential monitoring (detecting compromised passwords), session integrity monitoring (detecting stolen session replay), and identity hygiene enforcement (reducing the attack surface). Push provides all four from a single browser-based platform.

MFA significantly reduces ATO from credential theft, but it doesn't prevent ATO from session hijacking or AiTM phishing. AiTM captures the post-MFA session token. Session hijacking replays a stolen token, never triggering MFA. MFA is necessary but insufficient as a standalone defense.

Push provides browser-level detection (catching AiTM before the session is stolen) and session integrity monitoring (detecting replayed tokens) alongside MFA.

Several techniques, each exploiting a different part of the authentication lifecycle. AiTM phishing captures the post-MFA session token through a reverse proxy. Device code phishing and consent phishing are authorization-layer attacks that occur after the user has already authenticated successfully on the real IdP. Session hijacking replays tokens stolen post-authentication by infostealers or malicious extensions. MFA downgrade attacks force fallback from phishing-resistant methods to weaker ones.

The common thread is the attacker obtains a valid token without needing to defeat MFA directly. Push detects all of these in the browser. Read about MFA bypass techniques.

Post-compromise: impossible travel, new MFA device registration, mail forwarding rules, unauthorized OAuth applications, unusual data access. Pre-compromise: phishing page visits, compromised credential use, session token replay.

Most organizations only detect post-compromise indicators — meaning the attacker already has access. Push detects pre-compromise indicators and early post-compromise indicators (session replay, mail forwarding rule changes).

Very fast — breakout times are measured in minutes. Once an attacker has a valid session, data exfiltration can begin immediately.

This makes pre-compromise detection essential. Push detects ATO at the earliest point — the phishing page or compromised credential — before the attacker gets in.

SIEMs detect post-compromise anomalies — unusual locations, impossible travel, new devices, suspicious data access. This occurs after the attacker already has access. The latency gives the attacker an operational window.

Push provides earlier detection, interception, and blocking — phishing page detection, compromised credential alerts, and session replay detection fire before or at the moment of compromise. Push integrates with your SIEM to provide this unique data, but also gives you real-time control in the browser to do something about it.

Credential phishing is a method — tricking someone into revealing their password. Account takeover is the outcome — gaining unauthorized access. Credential phishing is one of several methods leading to ATO, alongside AiTM, session hijacking, credential stuffing, and device code phishing.

Defending against credential phishing alone is insufficient. Push detects each method that leads to ATO.

Most ATO detection is post-compromise — IdP anomaly detection, impossible travel alerts, and SIEM correlation all fire after the attacker already has a valid session. By then, breakout times are measured in minutes. Email security catches some phishing lures but misses non-email channels. MFA blocks credential replay but not AiTM, session hijacking, or device code phishing.

Pre-compromise detection requires catching the attack at the phishing page (before credentials or sessions are stolen) and at the credential (before compromised passwords are used). Push detects ATO pre-compromise: behavioral phishing detection, compromised credential alerts at login, and device code phishing warnings before tokens are issued.

Credential stuffing is a method — automated replay of stolen username-password pairs against login pages. Account takeover is the outcome — unauthorized access to a user's account. Credential stuffing is one of several methods that lead to ATO, alongside AiTM phishing, session hijacking, device code phishing, and OAuth consent abuse.

Defending against credential stuffing alone isn't enough to prevent ATO. Push detects credential stuffing (compromised passwords at login) alongside the other ATO methods — behavioral phishing detection, session marker injection, and OAuth consent monitoring. Read about ATO prevention.