Meet the GoodGuys: Fake expert interview and webinar invitations that phish Google and Okta accounts

Luke Jennings
Luke Jennings
·
Nov 20, 2026
·
9 min read

Inside a new phishing campaign we're tracking that sends paid "expert interview" and webinar invitations impersonating big brands, including Accenture, Nvidia, SpaceX, and Google Cloud.

Push researchers are tracking a live phishing campaign that sends paid "expert interview" and webinar invitations impersonating big brands, including Accenture, Nvidia, SpaceX, and Google Cloud. The pages we've observed target work Google accounts, and the code also includes a fake Okta sign-in. We're calling it GoodGuys, after a hidden "GoodGuys sign-in simulation" label in every build. We think the label is a leftover from tricking an AI coding assistant past its safeguards when the kit was first built.

Indicators of compromise are provided at the end of the post.


Attack breakdown

GoodGuys is a Vite and React web app with three screens: a captcha gate, a brand landing page, and a fake Google sign-in. Every value the victim enters goes to a separate backend host, which tells the page which screen to show next.

Lures and delivery

Each GoodGuys lure invites the recipient to a paid interview, a feedback study, or a private briefing from a well-known brand. The Accenture page offers $600 for a 45-minute expert interview, and the Nvidia page offers $500 for a 45-minute "AI Experience & Feedback Study." Every build carries the same page description: "Share your expertise with <Brand> through a short paid expert interview."

One lure email we intercepted invited the recipient to a Google Cloud webinar. It came from interviews@hirevue[.]com. The email describes a session on moving AI applications into production and links to "View webinar details." That link leads to the Google Cloud skin of the kit.

The intercepted lure email, sent through HireVue, links to a Google Cloud webinar skin.
The intercepted lure email, sent through HireVue, links to a Google Cloud webinar skin.

Other lures reached recipients through legitimate email and event services whose accounts or link tracking the attackers had access to. We've seen click URLs from SendGrid accounts, Mandrill, Cvent, Commerce7, Phorest, Wellyx, Weave, and a click tracker on a Culver's domain. One chain went through Truescope's link tracker to a redirect page hosted on Amazon S3. Abusing legit email services, click-tracking, and link shorteners is a common way that attackers bypass sender authentication checks.

Captcha gate

Most skins open with a branded reCAPTCHA card which can escalate to an image challenge. The Google Cloud build copies Google's own "Our systems have detected unusual traffic from your computer network" page instead.

Most skins show a brand logo and a real reCAPTCHA, which can open an image challenge. The Google Cloud build copies Google's "unusual traffic" page instead.
Most skins show a brand logo and a real reCAPTCHA, which can open an image challenge. The Google Cloud build copies Google's "unusual traffic" page instead.

The page reports to the backend when the captcha is solved and sends a visitor record with the value captcha_passed.

Branded landing pages

We've seen GoodGuys domains for eight brands: Accenture, American Express, Coca-Cola, Culver's, Google Cloud, Nvidia, SpaceX, and Spotify. Each brand gets its own landing page, built to make a work sign-in look like a normal step. You can see a selection of captures below.

The Accenture skin asks for a name, an email address, and a phone number, then shows them back and offers "Continue with Google."
The Accenture skin asks for a name, an email address, and a phone number, then shows them back and offers "Continue with Google."
The Nvidia skin presents the sign-in as the first step of a private invitation.
The Nvidia skin presents the sign-in as the first step of a private invitation.
The Google Cloud skin is a webinar portal with a "View Your Invitation" button.
The Google Cloud skin is a webinar portal with a "View Your Invitation" button.
The GoodGuys SpaceX skin reuses the "Starship Product Briefing" lure and its Grok Heavy and SpaceX share rewards.
The GoodGuys SpaceX skin reuses the "Starship Product Briefing" lure and its Grok Heavy and SpaceX share rewards.

The SpaceX skin copies the "Starship Product Briefing" lure from the fake event campaign that Push analyzed on November 5. It keeps the same "3 months of Grok Heavy" and "SpaceX share" rewards and the same work account requirement. The kits and hosting behind the two pages are different, so we think the GoodGuys operators cloned the lure.

Mismatched page titles

The page titles and descriptions don't always match the skins. That points to sloppy work when the operators moved the kit between brands and deployments. For example:

  • The earliest captures, on paid-interview-portal[.]com, ran the Accenture and Spotify builds under the title "Expert Interviews | WPP Media."

  • The Google Cloud build still carries the SpaceX build's wording in its page description. The operators clearly made it from a copy of the SpaceX skin and didn't finish the edit.

  • The Culver's build's title is just "Expert Interviews," with no brand name. The other interview builds add the brand after the title, as in "Expert Interviews | Accenture."

Fake Google sign-in

The fake sign-in page is a typical Google clone that is branded to remain consistent with the lure. The kit accepts only work accounts. Its fake Google sign-in rejects Gmail, Yahoo, and Outlook addresses with the message "Enter a work email address."

The fake sign-in pages impersonating different brands.
The fake sign-in pages impersonating different brands.

Why the GoodGuys? The sign-in card in every build carries two hidden labels: "Sign-in simulation" and "GoodGuys sign-in simulation." They sit in accessibility text that only screen readers announce, so a visitor never sees them. We think the label is a leftover from how the kit was first built. Calling the page a sign-in "simulation" for a made-up company is the kind of framing someone would use to get an AI coding assistant past its guardrails when asking it to build a phishing page. The label then stayed in every build we've collected.


How the sign-in gets relayed

GoodGuys doesn't use a reverse proxy. The fake page handles the email and password steps itself and sends both to the attacker's backend. After the password, it shows a "Loading next step" bar and waits until the backend says which screen comes next. That might be an SMS or authenticator prompt, a "Wrong password" error, the Okta sign-in, or the end screen. The commands look built for a person at a control panel, so we think an operator replays each value against the real Google or Okta sign-in and asks the victim for whatever it asks for next. To the victim, the steps look the same as a normal Google sign-in.

How the GoodGuys operator relay works.
How the GoodGuys operator relay works.

Learn more about the different AiTM mechanics and techniques in our post on the evolution of AiTM attacks in 2026.

The kit splits the work between two servers. The landing host only delivers the page to the victim. Everything the victim types goes to a separate backend server, and the operator's instructions come back to the page from that server over a live socket.io connection.

Once the sign-in screen loads, the page opens a socket.io channel to the backend. It sends register {role:"client", session} and waits for command {cmd, payload} messages. The client role suggests the backend also has an operator role and a panel.

Operator command

What the victim sees

Operator command:

login_error, password_error

What the victim sees:

"Couldn't find this account" or "Wrong password" on the Google screen

Operator command:

phone_number

What the victim sees:

A prompt to confirm the phone number on the account

Operator command:

sms_code, sms_code_error

What the victim sees:

A prompt for the 6-digit code sent by text

Operator command:

auth_code, auth_code_error

What the victim sees:

A prompt for the Google Authenticator code

Operator command:

tap_code

What the victim sees:

A 2-digit number to tap on the phone, as in Google's sign-in prompt

Operator command:

okta_login, okta_login_error, okta_pass_error

What the victim sees:

An Okta username and password screen, branded "Connecting to <Brand>" and "Powered by Okta"

Operator command:

okta_push

What the victim sees:

"Push notification sent," with a "Send push automatically" option for Okta Verify

Operator command:

okta_code, okta_auth, okta_sms (and their _error forms)

What the victim sees:

A prompt for an Okta Verify, Google Authenticator, or SMS code

Operator command:

redirect

What the victim sees:

The browser goes to a URL the operator supplies

Operator command:

complete

What the victim sees:

The "Thank you for your application!" end screen

Every value goes to https://<backend>/backend/api/submit.php as JSON with four fields: session_id, type, value, and extra. Each request carries an X-Session-ID header with the same session ID, so the browser sends a CORS preflight request first. The session ID is the current time and a random string in base 36, 13 to 15 characters long, for example mwnl9p2hdb5ip9b. The type field takes one of these values:

  • visitor, sent as captcha_passed when the gate is solved

  • email, password, and phone

  • sms_code and auth_code

  • okta_user, okta_password, okta_auth_code, and okta_sms_code


Infrastructure and timeline

The landing hosts change much more frequently than the backend. Each brand gets its own subdomain on a domain that sounds like recruitment or research, such as interview-experts[.]com, sso-interview[.]com, researchparticipation[.]com, and feedback-study[.]com.

  • Landing hosts: The operators used AWS EC2 from October 13 to November 13, then moved to Vultr. Every host had its own IP address.

  • Backend: Every build from October 13 to November 18 sent credentials to importantfuture[.]com (162.0.225[.]230, Namecheap). From November 17, the Nvidia and Google Cloud builds send credentials to hypernovaguys[.]com (104.207.85[.]90) instead.

Key dates in the GoodGuys campaign, from the first captures to the latest backend switch.

Date (2026)

Event

Date (2026):

Oct 13

Event:

First captures, on paid-interview-portal[.]com under the "Expert Interviews | WPP Media" title.

Date (2026):

Oct 15

Event:

The Okta screens appear in the builds.

Date (2026):

Oct 18–21

Event:

The Spotify skin appears, followed by the Culver's skin on Oct 20.

Date (2026):

Nov 5

Event:

The American Express skin appears.

Date (2026):

Nov 12

Event:

The Coca-Cola skin appears.

Date (2026):

Nov 13

Event:

The landing hosts move from AWS EC2 to Vultr.

Date (2026):

Nov 17–19

Event:

The Nvidia and Google Cloud builds switch to the new backend, hypernovaguys[.]com. The SpaceX skin appears on Nov 17 and the Google Cloud skin on Nov 18.


We've also seen Coca-Cola interview lures that lead to a modified Evilginx 3 proxy, which relays Google's real sign-in page to target Google Ads accounts. The same operator may be behind both campaigns. They used the same abused SendGrid click tracker, on the erelease[.]com[.]au domain, in the same week, and both serve an identical Coca-Cola wordmark image. Both also pitch a paid interview to work accounts, with Google first and Okta as an option. However, the code and hosting are different, and a hijacked sending account can be shared or resold.


Learn more about Push

Push blocks phishing pages like GoodGuys by analyzing the page in real time in the browser, whatever the delivery vector. That includes links delivered by email, as well as links sent through messaging apps, social media, search results, and other channels. Push sees the page after the employee solves the captcha, so the gate that hides the kit from scanners doesn't hide it from Push.

Push customers are protected and don’t need to take any further action.

Book a live demo to learn more.

Know what you're up against. On December 2, Luke Jennings, VP Research at Push, will walk through the kits that get past email, network, and endpoint controls most often, ranked by breakthrough rate.


Indicators of compromise

The operators move landing hosts every few days, so these indicators have limited value for blocking and are most useful for hunting in logs. They're current as of November 20, 2026.

GoodGuys domains and IP addresses

Role

Domain

IP address

Hosting

Role:

Backend

Domain:

hypernovaguys[.]com

IP address:

104.207.85[.]90

Hosting:

Role:

Backend

Domain:

importantfuture[.]com

IP address:

162.0.225[.]230

Hosting:

Namecheap (AS22612)

Role:

Landing

Domain:

virtual[.]cloud-webinar[.]com

IP address:

149.248.19[.]152

Hosting:

Vultr

Role:

Landing

Domain:

google[.]webinar-cloud[.]com

IP address:

80.240.29[.]36

Hosting:

Vultr

Role:

Landing

Domain:

accenture[.]international-interviews[.]com

IP address:

136.244.66[.]163

Hosting:

Vultr

Role:

Landing

Domain:

nvidia[.]feedback-study[.]com

IP address:

95.179.161[.]218

Hosting:

Vultr

Role:

Landing

Domain:

accenture[.]company-interviews[.]com

IP address:

199.247.1[.]212

Hosting:

Vultr

Role:

Landing

Domain:

spacexgrok[.]company-mission[.]com

IP address:

45.76.232[.]140

Hosting:

Vultr

Role:

Landing

Domain:

accenture[.]internationally-interviews[.]com

IP address:

136.244.119[.]45

Hosting:

Vultr

Role:

Landing

Domain:

cocacola-company[.]interviewscompany[.]com

IP address:

66.245.193[.]191

Hosting:

Vultr

Role:

Landing

Domain:

accenture[.]interviews-master[.]com

IP address:

149.28.113[.]213

Hosting:

Vultr

Role:

Landing (likely, not captured)

Domain:

fetchx[.]com

IP address:

149.28.113[.]213

Hosting:

Vultr

Role:

Landing

Domain:

cocacola-company[.]insightparticipation[.]com

IP address:

18.225.209[.]245

Hosting:

AWS EC2

Role:

Landing

Domain:

accenture[.]interviewprograms[.]com

IP address:

54.193.109[.]70

Hosting:

AWS EC2

Role:

Landing

Domain:

accenture[.]interviewapplicants[.]com

IP address:

3.26.117[.]192

Hosting:

AWS EC2

Role:

Landing

Domain:

spotify[.]paidexpert-interviewsso[.]com

IP address:

3.101.75[.]151

Hosting:

AWS EC2

Role:

Landing

Domain:

amex[.]sso-expertinterviews[.]com

IP address:

18.144.241[.]196

Hosting:

AWS EC2

Role:

Landing

Domain:

amex[.]researchparticipation[.]com

IP address:

13.220.176[.]225

Hosting:

AWS (AS14618)

Role:

Landing

Domain:

amex[.]sso-interview[.]com

IP address:

52.65.236[.]40

Hosting:

AWS EC2

Role:

Landing

Domain:

accenture[.]sso-interview[.]com

IP address:

16.171.154[.]236

Hosting:

AWS EC2

Role:

Landing

Domain:

spotify[.]interview-experts[.]com

IP address:

34.248.232[.]29

Hosting:

AWS EC2

Role:

Landing

Domain:

spotify[.]research-interview[.]com

IP address:

13.39.106[.]64

Hosting:

AWS EC2

Role:

Landing

Domain:

amex[.]interview-experts[.]com

IP address:

18.145.194[.]221

Hosting:

AWS EC2

Role:

Landing

Domain:

accenture[.]applicants-interviewpro[.]com

IP address:

16.170.214[.]5

Hosting:

AWS EC2

Role:

Landing

Domain:

spotify[.]global-interviews[.]com

IP address:

63.32.99[.]110

Hosting:

AWS EC2

Role:

Landing

Domain:

lifeatspotify[.]interviewhubexperts[.]com

IP address:

3.121.125[.]185

Hosting:

AWS EC2

Role:

Landing

Domain:

lifeatspotify[.]researchsessions[.]com

IP address:

51.20.87[.]142

Hosting:

AWS EC2

Role:

Landing

Domain:

culvers[.]enterprise-interviews[.]com

IP address:

54.253.198[.]124

Hosting:

AWS EC2

Role:

Landing

Domain:

interview-expert-portal[.]com, spotify[.]interview-expert-portal[.]com

IP address:

3.104.118[.]219

Hosting:

AWS EC2

Role:

Landing

Domain:

experts-interview[.]com, spotify[.]experts-interview[.]com

IP address:

13.60.43[.]28

Hosting:

AWS EC2

Role:

Landing

Domain:

paid-interview-portal[.]com, accenture[.]paid-interview-portal[.]com

IP address:

18.133.231[.]78

Hosting:

AWS EC2

Evilginx proxy domains and IP addresses

All of these are on DigitalOcean except 13.63.28[.]157, which is on AWS and was used for one day.

Role

Domain

IP address

Role:

Gate, then proxy

Domain:

cocacolainterview[.]com, *.login.cocacolainterview[.]com

IP address:

165.232.88[.]9

Role:

Gate

Domain:

cocacolacareershub[.]com

IP address:

165.232.88[.]9

Role:

Lure and Okta proxy

Domain:

adsbillinghub[.]com, <org>-okta.login.adsbillinghub[.]com

IP address:

165.232.88[.]9

Role:

Lure and Google proxy

Domain:

adsbillinghub[.]com, login.adsbillinghub[.]com

IP address:

209.38.44[.]178

Role:

Google proxy

Domain:

account-secure[.]net

IP address:

64.226.94[.]90, 13.63.28[.]157, 209.38.44[.]178

File hashes (SHA-256)

The bundle file name stays the same for each skin, and the hash changes with each deployment.

File

Skin or deployment

SHA-256

File:

index-DOTVDRsd.js

Skin or deployment:

Google Cloud, virtual[.]cloud-webinar[.]com

SHA-256:

3afce1ae01a8b346338fe7348e3f470655ffb9fa833a5977af33aafd27241684

File:

index-DOTVDRsd.js

Skin or deployment:

Google Cloud, google[.]webinar-cloud[.]com

SHA-256:

d870675afdddfc62ba2f01750c67fc6348341f2d2be26ee57551a67c87385e76

File:

index-C7YWYun7.js

Skin or deployment:

Nvidia

SHA-256:

04295570a759dc514c9833f9976d23c2876fa1bad8510b1831f7d9869683cff6

File:

index-Ylpk1kKK.js

Skin or deployment:

SpaceX

SHA-256:

aa399ff327b8fbafbd9bd4f1054c20fb7cb9fc0ebe9ea2b8eb912f21d3606474

File:

index-r_age5TO.js

Skin or deployment:

Coca-Cola

SHA-256:

9ff82e910a9291dbae97b809b87b4cd03257befbab2d35c1e2f7b8f324f3f226

File:

index-B7Epk7k7.js

Skin or deployment:

Accenture (5 deployments)

SHA-256:

0a7e5b83991728cb9d7d54f10a2739ccc4042e985b1b3d71446d1e204448895a, 018d0d4668f0b7bcf04dc40b07306a9705c15f5e4ffc44f8f857d7fdbac97089, 5314b4ee2356a6434124d67afa4088f30b7b4e0807131e896680f6e4492cd4a6, 6e3a95cfc4b4dd81e62ee9ab9b758aef6c6478956271dd3bc0c24d8845271f57, 51652ffe763a85b0e3240c740ac3af678c6e8f57f24c89ab4f55b43270a8ca6f

File:

index-Dvfp1MVj.js

Skin or deployment:

Spotify (3 deployments)

SHA-256:

870bcfbee99b0fba4f4d5e92440b3f2fdb5417a6799a1bcaf5f2ebf3ba14a9cb, c02822545654341c888cce46cb0cb15b300dc7eac246e44ab24154c1ea446c75, 2d860ff34d4d074002bb963832571ba37a09d30266dca224a6168d729ea9ce42

File:

index-DHxrJ5OC.js

Skin or deployment:

American Express (2 deployments)

SHA-256:

ee1b5fabb9d75c07564b75372b8a195bc9342a878c1d5ff465657e915cf6118a, 85979cd81142f80f8f84a12160e192760916ea3eaebee104be3db85e189c52e3

File:

index-pgubi2Vx.js

Skin or deployment:

Culver's

SHA-256:

8278611c63a252c7ec591ce7b7dc12090331a4183063107d10df4e1e2d9f1a7b

File:

index-h3zoT7B2.css

Skin or deployment:

Google Cloud and SpaceX builds

SHA-256:

4028d6040fcbe75410869c9615ccda137d77f4c9a81855dc25e368e7677b620c

File:

index-pj2tPCmX.css

Skin or deployment:

Coca-Cola and Nvidia builds

SHA-256:

b5c0345aa6b0413dd004b9adf77452344b97c46e723bc5bf6c57d472cbf910c1

File:

index.html

Skin or deployment:

virtual[.]cloud-webinar[.]com

SHA-256:

62d86cd7e9f9196209ed79ba4403b8f65a4834ab5a06010d6ea33be2f9ebd782

File:

google-cloud-logo.png

Skin or deployment:

Google Cloud

SHA-256:

d775a30a835fd68c36b51519b5649c4bfeb7db44c004f8818b70abc36d798137

File:

cloud-experts.png

Skin or deployment:

Google Cloud

SHA-256:

2360967336a462d12425140a6d6cb324996d1460b5eb25b06baaffb2f5878fda

File:

Coca-Cola wordmark PNG

Skin or deployment:

Coca-Cola skin, and the Evilginx lure

SHA-256:

3a252766b99463844b779ff1681bf1a43f7f3b0e3571886422655b88528848e8

Abused sending services

These are legitimate services whose accounts or link tracking the attackers misused.

Service

Sender or click URL seen

Service:

HireVue

Sender or click URL seen:

interviews@hirevue[.]com (sender of the intercepted Google Cloud lure)

Service:

erelease (SendGrid link branding)

Sender or click URL seen:

links[.]erelease[.]com[.]au/ls/click

Service:

SendGrid

Sender or click URL seen:

u4725878, u26892420, u30119751, and u6442896[.]ct[.]sendgrid[.]net/ls/click

Service:

Mandrill

Sender or click URL seen:

mandrillapp[.]com/track/click/30770134

Service:

Planned (SendGrid)

Sender or click URL seen:

url565[.]planned[.]com/ls/click

Service:

Weave

Sender or click URL seen:

url6484[.]marketing[.]sg[.]weavecoms[.]com/ls/click

Service:

Cvent

Sender or click URL seen:

na[.]eventscloud[.]com/emarketing/go.php

Service:

Commerce7

Sender or click URL seen:

link[.]commerce7[.]com/ss/c/

Service:

Culver's

Sender or click URL seen:

l[.]culvers[.]com/s/c/

Service:

Phorest

Sender or click URL seen:

tracking[.]phorest[.]com/tracking/click

Service:

Wellyx

Sender or click URL seen:

email[.]maileu[.]wellyx[.]com/c/

Service:

Truescope, then Amazon S3

Sender or click URL seen:

tracking[.]truescope[.]com/CL0/ to amzn-s3-accentre-interviewsw[.]s3[.]us-west-1[.]amazonaws[.]com/index.html

About the author
Luke Jennings
Luke Jennings
Vice President, R&D