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Get involved on GitHub.",{"text":355,"url":334},"Explore the matrix","black",{"id":358,"columns":359},"About",[360,383,406],{"kind":267,"heading":361,"span":26,"links":362},"Get to know us",[363,368,373,378],{"title":364,"url":365,"text":366,"navIcon":367},"About us","\u002Fabout","Meet the team and learn what drives us","sharp-regular:faBuilding",{"title":369,"url":370,"text":371,"navIcon":372},"Partners","\u002Fpartner","Become a partner and access resources","sharp-regular:faHandshakeSimple",{"title":374,"url":375,"text":376,"navIcon":377},"Investors","\u002Fabout#investors","Learn more about our investors and advisors","sharp-regular:faArrowTrendUp",{"title":379,"url":380,"text":381,"navIcon":382},"Customer stories","\u002Fcustomer-stories","What customers love about Push","sharp-regular:faBriefcase",{"kind":267,"heading":384,"span":26,"links":385},"Keep up with us",[386,391,396,401],{"title":387,"url":388,"text":389,"navIcon":390},"Events","\u002Fevents","See upcoming webinars and in-person events","sharp-regular:faCalendarStar",{"title":392,"url":393,"text":394,"navIcon":395},"News","\u002Fnews","Stay up to date on company news","sharp-regular:faNewspaper",{"title":397,"url":398,"text":399,"navIcon":400},"Careers","\u002Fcareers","Explore open roles","sharp-regular:faUsers",{"title":402,"url":403,"text":404,"navIcon":405},"Contact us","\u002Fcontact","Have a question? We're here to help","sharp-regular:faMessagesQuestion",{"kind":407,"heading":408,"testimonials":409},"testimonials","What customers say",[410,417,422],{"quote":411,"author":412,"jobTitle":413,"image":414,"url":380,"ctaText":415,"background":416},"Security is only as good as its weakest link. From day one, Push found the gaps that would allow attackers to circumvent our controls. We use Push every day — they're one of my favourite teams to work with.","Jason Waits","\u003Cp>CISO, Inductive Automation\u003C\u002Fp>","https:\u002F\u002Fcdn.builder.io\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fimage\u002Fassets%2Ff3a1111ff5be48cdbb123cd9f5795a05%2Ff04c0c0689ce4a89ac0f0708d78c0a07","Read the customer story","white",{"quote":418,"author":419,"jobTitle":420,"image":421,"url":380,"ctaText":415,"background":416},"I'm not going to be able to shove a browser on everybody. I need to be able to support them where they are. 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0-40z",{"id":486,"title":487,"authorsCollection":488,"content":498,"extension":1665,"faqItemsCollection":1666,"faqTitle":30,"featured":15,"hashTags":30,"meta":1668,"metaTitle":1669,"ogImage":30,"postType":1670,"publishedDate":1671,"relatedBlogPostsCollection":1672,"slug":1710,"stem":1711,"subtitle":30,"summary":1712,"synopsis":1723,"sys":1724,"tagsCollection":1727,"topicsCollection":1733,"__hash__":1794},"blog\u002Fblog\u002Faitm-phishing-dom-mirroring.json","From reverse proxies to DOM mirroring: the evolution of AiTM attacks in 2026",{"items":489},[490],{"fullName":491,"firstName":492,"jobTitle":493,"socialLinks":494,"profilePicture":496},"Luke Jennings","Luke","Vice President, R&D",[495],"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.linkedin.com\u002Fin\u002Fluke-jennings-042b5619b\u002F",{"url":497},"https:\u002F\u002Fimages.ctfassets.net\u002Fy1cdw1ablpvd\u002F4Hosb4zKi1dA0PUyDLMe1h\u002F27e09d894861f2196ba794037986fb08\u002FT016S22KZ96-U02NVQM7ZD4-57761d542d83-512.jpeg",{"json":499,"links":1445},{"nodeType":500,"data":501,"content":502},"document",{},[503,514,521,541,606,615,622,628,632,640,647,653,660,667,670,677,684,692,752,759,807,813,816,823,830,839,882,888,894,901,909,916,923,1006,1012,1018,1024,1031,1039,1058,1076,1082,1088,1095,1103,1110,1117,1159,1165,1171,1177,1184,1190,1197,1203,1211,1218,1225,1231,1234,1241,1248,1255,1262,1319,1326,1333,1366,1373,1380,1386,1389,1396,1403,1409,1412,1419,1426],{"nodeType":504,"data":505,"content":506},"paragraph",{},[507],{"nodeType":508,"value":509,"marks":510,"data":513},"text","AiTM phishing has changed a lot since we first wrote about it. It's also got harder to follow. Security vendors group and describe these attacks in different ways, so the same kit can get a different label depending on whose report you read. In this post, we set out what the AiTM landscape looks like today, and clear up the main points of confusion we come across.",[511],{"type":512},"bold",{},{"nodeType":504,"data":515,"content":516},{},[517],{"nodeType":508,"value":518,"marks":519,"data":520},"Adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing is how criminals take over accounts that are protected by MFA. A kit puts attacker infrastructure between the victim and the real sign-in page. It relays the password and the second factor as the victim enters them, and it keeps the session that the service issues at the end.",[],{},{"nodeType":504,"data":522,"content":523},{},[524,528,537],{"nodeType":508,"value":525,"marks":526,"data":527},"When we first ",[],{},{"nodeType":529,"data":530,"content":532},"hyperlink",{"uri":531},"https:\u002F\u002Fpushsecurity.com\u002Fblog\u002Fphishing-2-0-how-phishing-toolkits-are-evolving-with-aitm\u002F",[533],{"nodeType":508,"value":534,"marks":535,"data":536},"wrote about AiTM phishing",[],{},{"nodeType":508,"value":538,"marks":539,"data":540}," in 2024, it mostly meant a reverse proxy like Evilginx. That's no longer the whole picture. We group today's AiTM kits into four classes, based on how the sign-in page is presented to the victim:",[],{},{"nodeType":542,"data":543,"content":544},"unordered-list",{},[545,561,576,591],{"nodeType":546,"data":547,"content":548},"list-item",{},[549],{"nodeType":504,"data":550,"content":551},{},[552,557],{"nodeType":508,"value":553,"marks":554,"data":556},"Reverse proxy.",[555],{"type":512},{},{"nodeType":508,"value":558,"marks":559,"data":560}," The kit passes the vendor's real sign-in page through attacker infrastructure, so the victim sees the real page on the wrong domain. This is classic AiTM, as in the original Evilginx.",[],{},{"nodeType":546,"data":562,"content":563},{},[564],{"nodeType":504,"data":565,"content":566},{},[567,572],{"nodeType":508,"value":568,"marks":569,"data":571},"Replica page.",[570],{"type":512},{},{"nodeType":508,"value":573,"marks":574,"data":575}," The kit serves its own copy or lookalike of the sign-in page and relays what the victim enters to the real service. This is the most common class we see today.",[],{},{"nodeType":546,"data":577,"content":578},{},[579],{"nodeType":504,"data":580,"content":581},{},[582,587],{"nodeType":508,"value":583,"marks":584,"data":586},"Pixel streaming.",[585],{"type":512},{},{"nodeType":508,"value":588,"marks":589,"data":590}," The attacker runs a real browser and streams it into the phishing page as video frames, so the sign-in completes in the attacker's browser. This is the rarest class.",[],{},{"nodeType":546,"data":592,"content":593},{},[594],{"nodeType":504,"data":595,"content":596},{},[597,602],{"nodeType":508,"value":598,"marks":599,"data":601},"DOM mirroring.",[600],{"type":512},{},{"nodeType":508,"value":603,"marks":604,"data":605}," The kit rebuilds a copy of the real sign-in page in the victim's browser, from page data sent by the attacker's remote browser. That remote browser loads the real page and completes the real sign-in. This is the newest and fastest-growing class. We look at why below.",[],{},{"nodeType":607,"data":608,"content":614},"embedded-entry-block",{"target":609},{"sys":610},{"id":611,"type":612,"linkType":613},"2vL9dXII6f1Gk0ZC6HkPMZ","Link","Entry",[],{"nodeType":504,"data":616,"content":617},{},[618],{"nodeType":508,"value":619,"marks":620,"data":621},"Vendors use plenty of other names for these mechanisms, such as browser-in-the-middle (BitM), MitM phishing, real-time phishing panels, \"synchronous relay\" and many more. We refer to them all as AiTM.",[],{},{"nodeType":607,"data":623,"content":627},{"target":624},{"sys":625},{"id":626,"type":612,"linkType":613},"6GFLH2lUmVafLsZ32Oy9io",[],{"nodeType":629,"data":630,"content":631},"hr",{},[],{"nodeType":633,"data":634,"content":635},"heading-1",{},[636],{"nodeType":508,"value":637,"marks":638,"data":639},"Four ways to sit in the middle of a login",[],{},{"nodeType":504,"data":641,"content":642},{},[643],{"nodeType":508,"value":644,"marks":645,"data":646},"Every AiTM attack has the same three parties: The victim's browser, the attacker's infrastructure, and the real sign-in service. The four classes differ in the exact method used to intercept the login. Even that isn't fixed. A replica page, for example, can relay the sign-in through a script, a human operator, or an attacker's browser. A reverse proxy can use one too, as Evilginx Pro does with EvilPuppet.",[],{},{"nodeType":607,"data":648,"content":652},{"target":649},{"sys":650},{"id":651,"type":612,"linkType":613},"1VXGzJu6QLO0gsAn84x6xk",[],{"nodeType":504,"data":654,"content":655},{},[656],{"nodeType":508,"value":657,"marks":658,"data":659},"Pixel streaming and DOM mirroring always run through a browser on the attacker's side. The victim never touches the real sign-in page: the attacker's browser loads it, then completes the sign-in with what the victim types.",[],{},{"nodeType":504,"data":661,"content":662},{},[663],{"nodeType":508,"value":664,"marks":665,"data":666},"Replica pages and reverse proxies typically relay the sign-in with a script or manually via an operator, but some kits drive a real browser at the backend instead, as Tycoon 2FA did for Google sign-ins. Evilginx Pro's EvilPuppet module does the same for a reverse proxy: It runs a real browser on the attacker's server and injects its telemetry into the proxied sign-in.",[],{},{"nodeType":629,"data":668,"content":669},{},[],{"nodeType":633,"data":671,"content":672},{},[673],{"nodeType":508,"value":674,"marks":675,"data":676},"Why are attackers moving to DOM mirroring?",[],{},{"nodeType":504,"data":678,"content":679},{},[680],{"nodeType":508,"value":681,"marks":682,"data":683},"Because it gives attackers the realism of a reverse proxy with the authenticity of a remote browser. That comes down to two decisions: running a real browser at the back end, and then choosing how to show it to the victim.",[],{},{"nodeType":685,"data":686,"content":687},"heading-2",{},[688],{"nodeType":508,"value":689,"marks":690,"data":691},"Why run a remote browser?",[],{},{"nodeType":542,"data":693,"content":694},{},[695,722,737],{"nodeType":546,"data":696,"content":697},{},[698],{"nodeType":504,"data":699,"content":700},{},[701,706,710,718],{"nodeType":508,"value":702,"marks":703,"data":705},"Sign-in services now check the browser. ",[704],{"type":512},{},{"nodeType":508,"value":707,"marks":708,"data":709},"Google ",[],{},{"nodeType":529,"data":711,"content":713},{"uri":712},"https:\u002F\u002Fsecurity.googleblog.com\u002F2019\u002F04\u002Fbetter-protection-against-man-in-middle.html",[714],{"nodeType":508,"value":715,"marks":716,"data":717},"blocks sign-ins it can't tell apart from a man-in-the-middle attack",[],{},{"nodeType":508,"value":719,"marks":720,"data":721},", using browser telemetry that a proxy or relay script can't fake. A real browser on the real page produces it. That's why Greatness, VoidProxy and DOMDIFFER use one for Google, as Tycoon 2FA did.",[],{},{"nodeType":546,"data":723,"content":724},{},[725],{"nodeType":504,"data":726,"content":727},{},[728,733],{"nodeType":508,"value":729,"marks":730,"data":732},"It works on any site.",[731],{"type":512},{},{"nodeType":508,"value":734,"marks":735,"data":736}," A real browser copes with new steps, bot checks and redesigns without any code written for that site, so one engine covers every brand.",[],{},{"nodeType":546,"data":738,"content":739},{},[740],{"nodeType":504,"data":741,"content":742},{},[743,748],{"nodeType":508,"value":744,"marks":745,"data":747},"The session starts in the attacker's browser.",[746],{"type":512},{},{"nodeType":508,"value":749,"marks":750,"data":751}," There's no cookie to replay. Controls that tie a session to a device, such as DBSC, tie it to the attacker's device.",[],{},{"nodeType":685,"data":753,"content":754},{},[755],{"nodeType":508,"value":756,"marks":757,"data":758},"Why mirror the DOM?",[],{},{"nodeType":542,"data":760,"content":761},{},[762,777,792],{"nodeType":546,"data":763,"content":764},{},[765],{"nodeType":504,"data":766,"content":767},{},[768,773],{"nodeType":508,"value":769,"marks":770,"data":772},"It doesn't look like a remote screen.",[771],{"type":512},{},{"nodeType":508,"value":774,"marks":775,"data":776}," Pixel streaming sends a picture, with the lag and blur that go with it. A mirror is real HTML drawn by the victim's own browser. Laurseraph's switch suggests attackers have noticed.",[],{},{"nodeType":546,"data":778,"content":779},{},[780],{"nodeType":504,"data":781,"content":782},{},[783,788],{"nodeType":508,"value":784,"marks":785,"data":787},"It keeps the vendor's code off the attacker's domain.",[786],{"type":512},{},{"nodeType":508,"value":789,"marks":790,"data":791}," A reverse proxy runs the vendor's scripts on the attacker's domain, where they can notice something is wrong. A mirror strips them out, so they only run in the attacker's browser, on the real site.",[],{},{"nodeType":546,"data":793,"content":794},{},[795],{"nodeType":504,"data":796,"content":797},{},[798,803],{"nodeType":508,"value":799,"marks":800,"data":802},"It's cheap to build.",[801],{"type":512},{},{"nodeType":508,"value":804,"marks":805,"data":806}," It's made from browser automation and open-source libraries such as rrweb and diffDOM, which AI coding tools make easy to put together.",[],{},{"nodeType":607,"data":808,"content":812},{"target":809},{"sys":810},{"id":811,"type":612,"linkType":613},"51lpPFAJhah2K2h7Lcq7iV",[],{"nodeType":629,"data":814,"content":815},{},[],{"nodeType":633,"data":817,"content":818},{},[819],{"nodeType":508,"value":820,"marks":821,"data":822},"How each class works",[],{},{"nodeType":685,"data":824,"content":825},{},[826],{"nodeType":508,"value":827,"marks":828,"data":829},"Reverse proxy",[],{},{"nodeType":504,"data":831,"content":832},{},[833],{"nodeType":508,"value":834,"marks":835,"data":838},"Also known as: classic AiTM, transparent proxy, MitM phishing",[836],{"type":837},"italic",{},{"nodeType":504,"data":840,"content":841},{},[842,846,854,858,866,870,878],{"nodeType":508,"value":843,"marks":844,"data":845},"A reverse proxy fetches the vendor's real sign-in page, rewrites the hostnames, and passes the page to the victim. The victim's browser runs the vendor's own code on the attacker's domain, and every request goes through the proxy to the real service. Evilginx set the pattern when it was released in 2017. ",[],{},{"nodeType":529,"data":847,"content":849},{"uri":848},"https:\u002F\u002Fbreakdev.org\u002Fevilginx-pro-reveal\u002F",[850],{"nodeType":508,"value":851,"marks":852,"data":853},"Evilginx Pro",[],{},{"nodeType":508,"value":855,"marks":856,"data":857}," has since added a module called EvilPuppet, which runs a real browser on the attacker's server and injects its telemetry into the proxied sign-in. ",[],{},{"nodeType":529,"data":859,"content":861},{"uri":860},"https:\u002F\u002Fpushsecurity.com\u002Fthreat-intelligence\u002Fnakedpages",[862],{"nodeType":508,"value":863,"marks":864,"data":865},"NakedPages",[],{},{"nodeType":508,"value":867,"marks":868,"data":869}," and ",[],{},{"nodeType":529,"data":871,"content":873},{"uri":872},"https:\u002F\u002Fpushsecurity.com\u002Fthreat-intelligence\u002Fvoidproxy",[874],{"nodeType":508,"value":875,"marks":876,"data":877},"VoidProxy",[],{},{"nodeType":508,"value":879,"marks":880,"data":881}," are current examples. Because the page is the vendor's own, a proxy usually survives a vendor redesign without changes.",[],{},{"nodeType":607,"data":883,"content":887},{"target":884},{"sys":885},{"id":886,"type":612,"linkType":613},"2exH7Pbs4Yxi2PxGxKhHLJ",[],{"nodeType":607,"data":889,"content":893},{"target":890},{"sys":891},{"id":892,"type":612,"linkType":613},"3NDwkoIIfhyBauLGDHS2SZ",[],{"nodeType":685,"data":895,"content":896},{},[897],{"nodeType":508,"value":898,"marks":899,"data":900},"Replica page",[],{},{"nodeType":504,"data":902,"content":903},{},[904],{"nodeType":508,"value":905,"marks":906,"data":908},"Also known as: synchronous relay, credential relay, real-time phishing panel, human-in-the-loop phishing",[907],{"type":837},{},{"nodeType":504,"data":910,"content":911},{},[912],{"nodeType":508,"value":913,"marks":914,"data":915},"Most current AiTM kits don't proxy the page at all. They serve their own page, which is either a lookalike or a saved copy of the vendor's markup. What the victim types goes to the kit's backend, and the backend replays each step against the real service. When the service asks for a second factor, the kit shows its own MFA prompt. The vendor's scripts never load in the victim's browser directly.",[],{},{"nodeType":504,"data":917,"content":918},{},[919],{"nodeType":508,"value":920,"marks":921,"data":922},"How the kit relays the sign-in varies:",[],{},{"nodeType":542,"data":924,"content":925},{},[926,941,956,983],{"nodeType":546,"data":927,"content":928},{},[929],{"nodeType":504,"data":930,"content":931},{},[932,937],{"nodeType":508,"value":933,"marks":934,"data":936},"Automated script.",[935],{"type":512},{},{"nodeType":508,"value":938,"marks":939,"data":940}," Sneaky 2FA and Mamba 2FA replay each step against the real service from the kit's backend, with no human involved.",[],{},{"nodeType":546,"data":942,"content":943},{},[944],{"nodeType":504,"data":945,"content":946},{},[947,952],{"nodeType":508,"value":948,"marks":949,"data":951},"Backend browser.",[950],{"type":512},{},{"nodeType":508,"value":953,"marks":954,"data":955}," Some kits drive a real browser at the backend instead. Tycoon 2FA did this for Google sign-ins.",[],{},{"nodeType":546,"data":957,"content":958},{},[959],{"nodeType":504,"data":960,"content":961},{},[962,967,971,979],{"nodeType":508,"value":963,"marks":964,"data":966},"Operator-run panel.",[965],{"type":512},{},{"nodeType":508,"value":968,"marks":969,"data":970}," With real-time panels such as ",[],{},{"nodeType":529,"data":972,"content":974},{"uri":973},"https:\u002F\u002Fpushsecurity.com\u002Fblog\u002Finside-criminal-phishing-panel",[975],{"nodeType":508,"value":976,"marks":977,"data":978},"Doko's Panel",[],{},{"nodeType":508,"value":980,"marks":981,"data":982},", which has been linked to ShinyHunters attacks, an operator runs each stage by hand. The victim waits behind a loading gate until the operator approves them. The operator then enters the credentials at the real service and sends the victim a matching MFA prompt.",[],{},{"nodeType":546,"data":984,"content":985},{},[986],{"nodeType":504,"data":987,"content":988},{},[989,994,1002],{"nodeType":508,"value":990,"marks":991,"data":993},"Manual relay over Telegram. ",[992],{"type":512},{},{"nodeType":529,"data":995,"content":997},{"uri":996},"https:\u002F\u002Fpushsecurity.com\u002Fthreat-intelligence\u002Fxxevite",[998],{"nodeType":508,"value":999,"marks":1000,"data":1001},"XXEVITE",[],{},{"nodeType":508,"value":1003,"marks":1004,"data":1005},", which uses fake invitations from brands like Paperless Post and evite, sends credentials to its operators in Telegram, and they appear to enter them by hand.",[],{},{"nodeType":607,"data":1007,"content":1011},{"target":1008},{"sys":1009},{"id":1010,"type":612,"linkType":613},"5NdIPd7fTGJWOA8WbABC6C",[],{"nodeType":607,"data":1013,"content":1017},{"target":1014},{"sys":1015},{"id":1016,"type":612,"linkType":613},"6OCDjl0DAVCaEYpy7IU233",[],{"nodeType":607,"data":1019,"content":1023},{"target":1020},{"sys":1021},{"id":1022,"type":612,"linkType":613},"1kvm4nQojnGryaemweHzi7",[],{"nodeType":685,"data":1025,"content":1026},{},[1027],{"nodeType":508,"value":1028,"marks":1029,"data":1030},"Pixel streaming ",[],{},{"nodeType":504,"data":1032,"content":1033},{},[1034],{"nodeType":508,"value":1035,"marks":1036,"data":1038},"Also known as: browser-in-the-middle (BitM), noVNC phishing, remote browser phishing",[1037],{"type":837},{},{"nodeType":504,"data":1040,"content":1041},{},[1042,1046,1054],{"nodeType":508,"value":1043,"marks":1044,"data":1045},"A pixel-streaming kit shows the victim an image or video of the real sign-in page, streamed from the attacker's remote browser. The attacker runs a real browser for each victim, usually in a container, and draws the stream into a canvas on the phishing page. The victim's clicks and keystrokes go back over a WebSocket, and the sign-in completes in the attacker's browser. This is the original browser-in-the-middle (BitM) technique, which the researcher mrd0x ",[],{},{"nodeType":529,"data":1047,"content":1049},{"uri":1048},"https:\u002F\u002Fmrd0x.com\u002Fbypass-2fa-using-novnc\u002F",[1050],{"nodeType":508,"value":1051,"marks":1052,"data":1053},"first wrote about in 2022",[],{},{"nodeType":508,"value":1055,"marks":1056,"data":1057},".",[],{},{"nodeType":504,"data":1059,"content":1060},{},[1061,1064,1072],{"nodeType":508,"value":39,"marks":1062,"data":1063},[],{},{"nodeType":529,"data":1065,"content":1067},{"uri":1066},"https:\u002F\u002Fpushsecurity.com\u002Fthreat-intelligence\u002Flaurseraph",[1068],{"nodeType":508,"value":1069,"marks":1070,"data":1071},"Laurseraph",[],{},{"nodeType":508,"value":1073,"marks":1074,"data":1075},", also known as GhostFrame, is a recent example that targets Google accounts. There's no sign-in form in the page for a scanner to match, and the kit needs no update when Google changes its pages. The trade-off for the attacker is that the page is visibly a remote screen. Laurseraph has recently switched to DOM mirroring instead, showing how kits can adapt their methods over time.",[],{},{"nodeType":607,"data":1077,"content":1081},{"target":1078},{"sys":1079},{"id":1080,"type":612,"linkType":613},"7cP0NwAM9r1CPTmbJDSuTZ",[],{"nodeType":607,"data":1083,"content":1087},{"target":1084},{"sys":1085},{"id":1086,"type":612,"linkType":613},"JiOqPMMaXxnAS53Do2O5S",[],{"nodeType":685,"data":1089,"content":1090},{},[1091],{"nodeType":508,"value":1092,"marks":1093,"data":1094},"DOM mirroring",[],{},{"nodeType":504,"data":1096,"content":1097},{},[1098],{"nodeType":508,"value":1099,"marks":1100,"data":1102},"Also known as: browser-in-the-middle (BitM)",[1101],{"type":837},{},{"nodeType":504,"data":1104,"content":1105},{},[1106],{"nodeType":508,"value":1107,"marks":1108,"data":1109},"The attacker's browser loads the real sign-in page, turns the page structure (the DOM) into data, and sends the victim's browser a copy of the page, then sends each change as it happens. The victim's browser rebuilds the page with the vendor's scripts removed. The victim types into fields that look and behave like the real ones, and their input goes back to the attacker's browser.",[],{},{"nodeType":504,"data":1111,"content":1112},{},[1113],{"nodeType":508,"value":1114,"marks":1115,"data":1116},"So although a browser sits at the backend, as with pixel streaming, from the victim's side DOM mirroring behaves much more like a reverse proxy. Pixel streaming sends a picture of the page. DOM mirroring sends a working copy, with the vendor's real markup.",[],{},{"nodeType":504,"data":1118,"content":1119},{},[1120,1123,1131,1135,1143,1147,1155],{"nodeType":508,"value":39,"marks":1121,"data":1122},[],{},{"nodeType":529,"data":1124,"content":1126},{"uri":1125},"https:\u002F\u002Fpushsecurity.com\u002Fthreat-intelligence\u002Fdomdiffer",[1127],{"nodeType":508,"value":1128,"marks":1129,"data":1130},"DOMDIFFER",[],{},{"nodeType":508,"value":1132,"marks":1133,"data":1134}," does this against Google accounts with a renamed copy of the open-source diffDOM library. ",[],{},{"nodeType":529,"data":1136,"content":1138},{"uri":1137},"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.netcraft.com\u002Fblog\u002Fbluekit-phishing-as-a-service-threat",[1139],{"nodeType":508,"value":1140,"marks":1141,"data":1142},"Bluekit",[],{},{"nodeType":508,"value":1144,"marks":1145,"data":1146}," does the same with rrweb, an open-source session-replay library. ",[],{},{"nodeType":529,"data":1148,"content":1150},{"uri":1149},"https:\u002F\u002Fzerobec.com\u002Fblog\u002Fphantomdom-browser-in-the-middle-microsoft-365",[1151],{"nodeType":508,"value":1152,"marks":1153,"data":1154},"PhantomDOM",[],{},{"nodeType":508,"value":1156,"marks":1157,"data":1158},", reported on November 5, mirrors a Microsoft 365 sign-in from an operator-controlled browser.",[],{},{"nodeType":607,"data":1160,"content":1164},{"target":1161},{"sys":1162},{"id":1163,"type":612,"linkType":613},"7IJmkLvwqW0dRDZdHSiibL",[],{"nodeType":607,"data":1166,"content":1170},{"target":1167},{"sys":1168},{"id":1169,"type":612,"linkType":613},"1Row2h7XjC9751hbxoz1P3",[],{"nodeType":607,"data":1172,"content":1176},{"target":1173},{"sys":1174},{"id":1175,"type":612,"linkType":613},"5Brl2W7Cfug8X8zO9aAS9m",[],{"nodeType":504,"data":1178,"content":1179},{},[1180],{"nodeType":508,"value":1181,"marks":1182,"data":1183},"The history of NakedPages (a classic reverse-proxy based kit) provides a strong case study of how attackers are switching to DOM mirroring. DOMDIFFER, which we believe grew out of it, uses DOM mirroring instead, and became the dominant strain in the family from March 2026.",[],{},{"nodeType":607,"data":1185,"content":1189},{"target":1186},{"sys":1187},{"id":1188,"type":612,"linkType":613},"6ATAMj91dI1h6qbv0RlLnA",[],{"nodeType":504,"data":1191,"content":1192},{},[1193],{"nodeType":508,"value":1194,"marks":1195,"data":1196},"You can see a full DOMDIFFER sign-in starting from a fake voicemail notification lure below. ",[],{},{"nodeType":607,"data":1198,"content":1202},{"target":1199},{"sys":1200},{"id":1201,"type":612,"linkType":613},"4CpFbzAZncCblDWZYixxh7",[],{"nodeType":685,"data":1204,"content":1205},{},[1206],{"nodeType":508,"value":1207,"marks":1208,"data":1210},"What all four classes share",[1209],{"type":512},{},{"nodeType":504,"data":1212,"content":1213},{},[1214],{"nodeType":508,"value":1215,"marks":1216,"data":1217},"The class only describes how the phishing page reaches the victim's browser. Everything around it is shared across all four. A kit from any class can reach the victim by email, calendar invite, search ad, messaging app, social media, or QR code. It can abuse legitimate services, such as cloud hosting, SaaS and file-sharing platforms, and compromised websites. It can also use the same evasion techniques, both around the page and on it.",[],{},{"nodeType":504,"data":1219,"content":1220},{},[1221],{"nodeType":508,"value":1222,"marks":1223,"data":1224},"Evasion techniques include bot checks, cloaking, trusted redirects, and fast-rotating domains, as well as obfuscated page code and anti-analysis tricks that block developer tools. In every class, the real service sees the sign-in come from the attacker's side rather than the victim's browser, and many kits route it through residential proxies so it looks like an ordinary home connection. So knowing the class tells you how the page is rendered to the victim, but not how the attack reaches them, or how it hides from security tools.",[],{},{"nodeType":607,"data":1226,"content":1230},{"target":1227},{"sys":1228},{"id":1229,"type":612,"linkType":613},"3Pa3OyVUvaEjX1MHX7L7r8",[],{"nodeType":629,"data":1232,"content":1233},{},[],{"nodeType":633,"data":1235,"content":1236},{},[1237],{"nodeType":508,"value":1238,"marks":1239,"data":1240},"What matters for defenders",[],{},{"nodeType":504,"data":1242,"content":1243},{},[1244],{"nodeType":508,"value":1245,"marks":1246,"data":1247},"You don't need to settle the naming argument to defend against these kits. The four classes differ in how they intercept the login, but none of them removes the need for the victim to load a page and interact with it.",[],{},{"nodeType":685,"data":1249,"content":1250},{},[1251],{"nodeType":508,"value":1252,"marks":1253,"data":1254},"Controls that help tackle AiTM",[],{},{"nodeType":504,"data":1256,"content":1257},{},[1258],{"nodeType":508,"value":1259,"marks":1260,"data":1261},"Passkeys and other FIDO2 methods are a strong defense against all four classes, and they're worth rolling out. Since the browser binds the response to the site that asked for it, the passkey doesn't work. But passkeys only protect what they cover, so don't rely on them alone:",[],{},{"nodeType":542,"data":1263,"content":1264},{},[1265,1275,1297],{"nodeType":546,"data":1266,"content":1267},{},[1268],{"nodeType":504,"data":1269,"content":1270},{},[1271],{"nodeType":508,"value":1272,"marks":1273,"data":1274},"Coverage is rarely complete. Not every app, account, or user can use a passkey yet, and the ones that can't are still exposed.",[],{},{"nodeType":546,"data":1276,"content":1277},{},[1278],{"nodeType":504,"data":1279,"content":1280},{},[1281,1285,1293],{"nodeType":508,"value":1282,"marks":1283,"data":1284},"Passkeys only help if the weaker methods go away. If an account still accepts a password and a one-time code, a kit can ",[],{},{"nodeType":529,"data":1286,"content":1288},{"uri":1287},"https:\u002F\u002Fpushsecurity.com\u002Fblog\u002Fmfa-downgrade-attacks\u002F",[1289],{"nodeType":508,"value":1290,"marks":1291,"data":1292},"downgrade the sign-in",[],{},{"nodeType":508,"value":1294,"marks":1295,"data":1296}," to the weaker method.",[],{},{"nodeType":546,"data":1298,"content":1299},{},[1300],{"nodeType":504,"data":1301,"content":1302},{},[1303,1307,1315],{"nodeType":508,"value":1304,"marks":1305,"data":1306},"Passkeys don't stop ",[],{},{"nodeType":529,"data":1308,"content":1310},{"uri":1309},"https:\u002F\u002Fpushsecurity.com\u002Fblog\u002Fauthorization-phishing",[1311],{"nodeType":508,"value":1312,"marks":1313,"data":1314},"authorization phishing",[],{},{"nodeType":508,"value":1316,"marks":1317,"data":1318},", and kits can now swap one payload for another. The same fake event pages sent Google users to VoidProxy and Microsoft users to a Kali365 device code flow. If one route is closed, the attacker serves a different one from the same page.",[],{},{"nodeType":685,"data":1320,"content":1321},{},[1322],{"nodeType":508,"value":1323,"marks":1324,"data":1325},"Controls that don't stop AiTM",[],{},{"nodeType":504,"data":1327,"content":1328},{},[1329],{"nodeType":508,"value":1330,"marks":1331,"data":1332},"Some controls that sound relevant don't stop any of the four classes:",[],{},{"nodeType":542,"data":1334,"content":1335},{},[1336,1351],{"nodeType":546,"data":1337,"content":1338},{},[1339],{"nodeType":504,"data":1340,"content":1341},{},[1342,1347],{"nodeType":508,"value":1343,"marks":1344,"data":1346},"Device Bound Session Credentials (DBSC)",[1345],{"type":512},{},{"nodeType":508,"value":1348,"marks":1349,"data":1350}," stops a stolen cookie from working on another device. A proxy can strip the registration and capture an unbound session, and DBSC can't protect against BitM.",[],{},{"nodeType":546,"data":1352,"content":1353},{},[1354],{"nodeType":504,"data":1355,"content":1356},{},[1357,1362],{"nodeType":508,"value":1358,"marks":1359,"data":1361},"Entra Token Protection",[1360],{"type":512},{},{"nodeType":508,"value":1363,"marks":1364,"data":1365}," binds tokens for native apps, not browsers, so it doesn't stop the browser cookie replay that AiTM depends on.",[],{},{"nodeType":685,"data":1367,"content":1368},{},[1369],{"nodeType":508,"value":1370,"marks":1371,"data":1372},"How Push detects and stops AiTM",[],{},{"nodeType":504,"data":1374,"content":1375},{},[1376],{"nodeType":508,"value":1377,"marks":1378,"data":1379},"Push detects and blocks AiTM in the browser, on the page itself, whatever channel delivered the link. Its behavioral phishing detection covers all four classes, whatever sub-technique a kit uses. Push analyzes signals from the page as it renders, such as its structure, how its scripts behave, how it handles credentials, and how it responds when the user interacts with it. Push's agentic threat hunting pipeline keeps refining these detections as kits change, so they don't depend on a domain, an IP address, or a named kit.",[],{},{"nodeType":607,"data":1381,"content":1385},{"target":1382},{"sys":1383},{"id":1384,"type":612,"linkType":613},"1UIQHZdCKjZwJH1vUIKfbi",[],{"nodeType":629,"data":1387,"content":1388},{},[],{"nodeType":633,"data":1390,"content":1391},{},[1392],{"nodeType":508,"value":1393,"marks":1394,"data":1395},"Summary",[],{},{"nodeType":504,"data":1397,"content":1398},{},[1399],{"nodeType":508,"value":1400,"marks":1401,"data":1402},"AiTM phishing comes in many forms. The labels will keep shifting, but the outcome, a stolen session, and the entry point, a page in the victim's browser, stays the same.",[],{},{"nodeType":607,"data":1404,"content":1408},{"target":1405},{"sys":1406},{"id":1407,"type":612,"linkType":613},"3YuOHrxloA3uYkrzFuT1vk",[],{"nodeType":629,"data":1410,"content":1411},{},[],{"nodeType":504,"data":1413,"content":1414},{},[1415],{"nodeType":508,"value":1416,"marks":1417,"data":1418},"Push Security is the most powerful AI-native security tool in the browser. Think EDR, but for the browser — high-fidelity telemetry and real-time control across every session, on every device, with no browser migration required.",[],{},{"nodeType":504,"data":1420,"content":1421},{},[1422],{"nodeType":508,"value":1423,"marks":1424,"data":1425},"Security teams use Push to detect and stop advanced browser-based attacks like AiTM phishing, ClickFix, and session hijacking; gain visibility and control over AI tool usage across their workforce; harden identities by surfacing credential reuse, SSO gaps, and shadow IT; and support data loss and insider investigations with browser-layer telemetry that other tools can't see.",[],{},{"nodeType":504,"data":1427,"content":1428},{},[1429,1433,1441],{"nodeType":508,"value":1430,"marks":1431,"data":1432},"Book a ",[],{},{"nodeType":529,"data":1434,"content":1436},{"uri":1435},"https:\u002F\u002Fpushsecurity.com\u002Fdemo",[1437],{"nodeType":508,"value":1438,"marks":1439,"data":1440},"live demo",[],{},{"nodeType":508,"value":1442,"marks":1443,"data":1444}," to learn more.",[],{},{"entries":1446},{"block":1447,"inline":1663,"hyperlink":1664},[1448,1456,1481,1487,1537,1544,1550,1556,1562,1568,1576,1582,1618,1624,1630,1636,1642,1648,1656],{"__typename":1449,"sys":1450,"title":1451,"caption":1451,"layoutMode":30,"file":1452},"Image",{"id":611},"How common each AiTM class is today, with example kits for each.",{"url":1453,"width":1454,"height":1455},"https:\u002F\u002Fimages.ctfassets.net\u002Fy1cdw1ablpvd\u002F2wptvcI4TaZNJLRoN4c7Cd\u002F965f307016a787ba83d34eccb7954064\u002F01-aitm-classes-by-prevalence.jpeg",2880,1904,{"__typename":1457,"sys":1458,"content":1459,"name":1480,"title":30},"InsightTextBlockComponent",{"id":626},{"json":1460,"links":1475},{"data":1461,"content":1462,"nodeType":500},{},[1463],{"data":1464,"content":1465,"nodeType":504},{},[1466,1471],{"data":1467,"marks":1468,"value":1470,"nodeType":508},{},[1469],{"type":512},"What about browser-in-the-browser?",{"data":1472,"marks":1473,"value":1474,"nodeType":508},{},[]," Another term you might come across is browser-in-the-browser (BitB). BitB is a fake pop-up window drawn inside the phishing page, complete with a fake address bar showing the real vendor's domain. It's a social engineering trick used by many AiTM kits that changes how the sign-in page is presented, not how the sign-in is relayed.",{"entries":1476},{"block":1477,"inline":1478,"hyperlink":1479},[],[],[],"DOM mirroring IB1",{"__typename":1449,"sys":1482,"title":637,"caption":1483,"layoutMode":30,"file":1484},{"id":651},"What the victim's browser receives in each AiTM class (left), and what relays the sign-in (middle). Orange lines mark an attacker's browser in the middle.",{"url":1485,"width":1454,"height":1486},"https:\u002F\u002Fimages.ctfassets.net\u002Fy1cdw1ablpvd\u002F4H02BVjA5cm1iXjYVfDcTW\u002F87c4a75a0f98e0c8ffd51eacea063547\u002F02-four-aitm-classes.jpeg",1960,{"__typename":1457,"sys":1488,"content":1489,"name":1536,"title":30},{"id":811},{"json":1490,"links":1531},{"nodeType":500,"data":1491,"content":1492},{},[1493],{"nodeType":504,"data":1494,"content":1495},{},[1496,1500,1505,1509,1516,1520,1527],{"nodeType":508,"value":1497,"marks":1498,"data":1499},"DOM mirroring kit",[],{},{"nodeType":508,"value":1501,"marks":1502,"data":1504}," \"",[1503],{"type":512},{},{"nodeType":508,"value":1506,"marks":1507,"data":1508},"DOMDIFFER\" was by far the #1 kit by breakthrough rate across August, September and October, at two to four times the rate of the second-ranked kit. ",[],{},{"nodeType":529,"data":1510,"content":1511},{"uri":1125},[1512],{"nodeType":508,"value":1513,"marks":1514,"data":1515},"See DOMDIFFER on our threat intelligence hub",[],{},{"nodeType":508,"value":1517,"marks":1518,"data":1519},", or ",[],{},{"nodeType":529,"data":1521,"content":1522},{"uri":56},[1523],{"nodeType":508,"value":1524,"marks":1525,"data":1526},"join our webinar",[],{},{"nodeType":508,"value":1528,"marks":1529,"data":1530}," to learn more about breakthrough rate and the kits getting through security controls.",[],{},{"entries":1532},{"block":1533,"inline":1534,"hyperlink":1535},[],[],[],"DOM mirroring IB2",{"__typename":1449,"sys":1538,"title":1539,"caption":1539,"layoutMode":30,"file":1540},{"id":886},"A recent NakedPages page. The victim sees Microsoft's real sign-in page, but on an attacker-controlled domain.",{"url":1541,"width":1542,"height":1543},"https:\u002F\u002Fimages.ctfassets.net\u002Fy1cdw1ablpvd\u002F32lhSDUZVYcasXMgmxPEJG\u002F314c6e0a046ac9a5600dec28fdf93b23\u002F03-nakedpages-page.png",1920,1080,{"__typename":1449,"sys":1545,"title":1546,"caption":1547,"layoutMode":30,"file":1548},{"id":892},"NakedPages 2","Under the hood, the same page is Microsoft's own sign-in code, down to its Knockout data bindings, served from the attacker's domain.",{"url":1549,"width":1542,"height":1543},"https:\u002F\u002Fimages.ctfassets.net\u002Fy1cdw1ablpvd\u002F7qsFogadX9ibPrqy9GfRCI\u002F7a908b07400c1f84c1950b68ec84e0b5\u002F04-nakedpages-under-the-hood.png",{"__typename":1449,"sys":1551,"title":1552,"caption":1553,"layoutMode":30,"file":1554},{"id":1010},"LIDSID 1","A recent LIDSID page. The kit's copy of Google's sign-in page loads from a blob URL on Google Cloud Storage, so the address bar shows a Google-owned domain.",{"url":1555,"width":1542,"height":1543},"https:\u002F\u002Fimages.ctfassets.net\u002Fy1cdw1ablpvd\u002F7Afq7guA47LrLCosNMkktZ\u002F4b3d304429b7cdba80e7ae5d4990a197\u002F05-lidsid-page.png",{"__typename":1449,"sys":1557,"title":1558,"caption":1559,"layoutMode":30,"file":1560},{"id":1016},"LIDSID 2","Under the hood, the Google-hosted page is only a wrapper. It decodes its settings from base64, loads the kit's own script, and frames the kit's copy of the Gmail sign-in from the attacker's server.",{"url":1561,"width":1542,"height":1543},"https:\u002F\u002Fimages.ctfassets.net\u002Fy1cdw1ablpvd\u002F21mo8aJdtJyvxmYKzKG3Dp\u002F835931e24904249aeb661ad0ac24b017\u002F07-lidsid-frame-markup.png",{"__typename":1449,"sys":1563,"title":1564,"caption":1565,"layoutMode":30,"file":1566},{"id":1022},"LIDSID 3","Inside that frame is the kit's own markup, with the developer's comments still in it, such as \"TAP CODE TO SIGN Div\". None of Google's own sign-in code is involved.",{"url":1567,"width":1542,"height":1543},"https:\u002F\u002Fimages.ctfassets.net\u002Fy1cdw1ablpvd\u002FKmVLAwxHmSkD7nwYvYLya\u002F102faca2ce74d8cab20d77ae5f5ace4d\u002F07-lidsid-frame-markup.png",{"__typename":1449,"sys":1569,"title":1570,"caption":1571,"layoutMode":30,"file":1572},{"id":1080},"Lauseraph 1","A recent Laurseraph page targeting Google, loaded from a blob URL on a Cloudflare Workers domain.",{"url":1573,"width":1574,"height":1575},"https:\u002F\u002Fimages.ctfassets.net\u002Fy1cdw1ablpvd\u002F6mA9XSNnS7wTzCJ2iKY198\u002F97de730b862f171abc4bdb3529c30897\u002F08-laurseraph-page.png",3456,2036,{"__typename":1449,"sys":1577,"title":1578,"caption":1579,"layoutMode":30,"file":1580},{"id":1086},"Lauseraph 2","Under the hood, the sign-in \"page\" is just an image streamed from the attacker's browser. Invisible input boxes sit on top of it, lined up with Google's real fields, to capture what the victim types.",{"url":1581,"width":1574,"height":1575},"https:\u002F\u002Fimages.ctfassets.net\u002Fy1cdw1ablpvd\u002F4XolIDQDGrYIpYKaPe4mHO\u002F3acf0d886101badfbd70f8d77137cbdf\u002F09-laurseraph-devtools.png",{"__typename":1457,"sys":1583,"content":1584,"name":1617,"title":30},{"id":1163},{"json":1585,"links":1612},{"nodeType":500,"data":1586,"content":1587},{},[1588],{"nodeType":504,"data":1589,"content":1590},{},[1591,1596,1600,1608],{"nodeType":508,"value":1592,"marks":1593,"data":1595},"Is DOM mirroring new?",[1594],{"type":512},{},{"nodeType":508,"value":1597,"marks":1598,"data":1599}," Not as a technique. A red team tool, ",[],{},{"nodeType":529,"data":1601,"content":1603},{"uri":1602},"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnexon33\u002FEvilPuppetJS",[1604],{"nodeType":508,"value":1605,"marks":1606,"data":1607},"EvilPuppetJS",[],{},{"nodeType":508,"value":1609,"marks":1610,"data":1611},", did it in 2023 (not to be confused with Evilginx Pro's EvilPuppet module). The change is that criminal kits now use it in real attacks. This is a common pattern: Attacks that start as red-team research often turn up in criminal kits later.",[],{},{"entries":1613},{"block":1614,"inline":1615,"hyperlink":1616},[],[],[],"DOM mirroring IB3",{"__typename":1449,"sys":1619,"title":1620,"caption":1621,"layoutMode":30,"file":1622},{"id":1169},"3D+ 1","A recent 3D+ page targeting Gmail, served from a long, random-looking Cloudflare Workers subdomain.",{"url":1623,"width":1574,"height":1575},"https:\u002F\u002Fimages.ctfassets.net\u002Fy1cdw1ablpvd\u002F4TuPwQJSJ6dGoiQDJQrAVK\u002F08f1c496a8b5fc44ba8b9e025eaf2783\u002F10-3dplus-page.png",{"__typename":1449,"sys":1625,"title":1626,"caption":1627,"layoutMode":30,"file":1628},{"id":1175},"3D+ 2","Under the hood, the page is built from Google's real markup, mirrored from the attacker's browser. Google's own sign-in code doesn't run. Instead, the kit's scripts at the bottom of the page open a live connection and apply each change as it arrives.",{"url":1629,"width":1574,"height":1575},"https:\u002F\u002Fimages.ctfassets.net\u002Fy1cdw1ablpvd\u002Fx0KXJdvzG78grSzA0UhRM\u002F4424c87615d569714aadd23ddb054af1\u002F11-3dplus-devtools.png",{"__typename":1449,"sys":1631,"title":1632,"caption":1632,"layoutMode":30,"file":1633},{"id":1188},"New hostnames per month for three NakedPages variants and DOMDIFFER, March 2023 to September 2026.",{"url":1634,"width":1454,"height":1635},"https:\u002F\u002Fimages.ctfassets.net\u002Fy1cdw1ablpvd\u002FK9XkCu9hsBax6cB6r6Ke6\u002F137a96bebc025cbd527c5c5122ed4448\u002F13-nakedpages-domdiffer-hostnames.jpeg",2120,{"__typename":1637,"sys":1638,"title":1639,"arcadeDemoUrl":1640,"playText":1641},"ArcadeDemo",{"id":1201},"A full DOMDIFFER sign-in starting from a fake voicemail notification lure.","https:\u002F\u002Fdemo.arcade.software\u002FSp9JL1kX49B1HRnGq1Ba?embed","2 mins",{"__typename":1449,"sys":1643,"title":1644,"caption":1644,"layoutMode":30,"file":1645},{"id":1229},"The stages of an AiTM attack. Delivery, service abuse and evasion are shared by all four classes. Only how the sign-in page reaches the victim's browser differs, and every class ends in a stolen session.",{"url":1646,"width":1454,"height":1647},"https:\u002F\u002Fimages.ctfassets.net\u002Fy1cdw1ablpvd\u002Fcji36XHgiUr5Rhgr7y4WS\u002F5744763941cb0899f7340ca6bcbd92b5\u002F14-aitm-attack-stages.jpeg",1776,{"__typename":1449,"sys":1649,"title":1650,"caption":1651,"layoutMode":30,"file":1652},{"id":1384},"push-block-screen","Push's full-page block screen, shown when a page is detected as phishing.",{"url":1653,"width":1654,"height":1655},"https:\u002F\u002Fimages.ctfassets.net\u002Fy1cdw1ablpvd\u002F78KGiemTUG3h15MchHU0dx\u002Fd08d000865d9d2528c1edbe87190b6be\u002F17-push-block-screen.png",2102,1164,{"__typename":1657,"sys":1658,"type":1659,"ctaText":1660,"buttonLabel":1661,"buttonColour":1662,"buttonUrl":56},"CtaWidget",{"id":1407},"Custom","Know what you're up against. On December 2, Luke Jennings, VP Research at Push, will walk through the kits that get past email, network, and endpoint controls most often, ranked by breakthrough rate.","Register Now","sunny orange",[],[],"json",{"items":1667},[],{},"Why DOM mirroring is the fastest growing AiTM technique","threat-research","2026-11-18T00:00:00.000Z",{"items":1673},[1674,1686,1697],{"__typename":1675,"sys":1676,"title":1678,"synopsis":1679,"publishedDate":1680,"slug":1681,"authorsCollection":1682},"BlogPosts",{"id":1677},"7DJnckJxP4CXyXhPJJpby5","Phishing 2.0: How phishing toolkits are evolving with AiTM","AiTM phishing uses a reverse proxy to steal session tokens and bypass MFA. Learn how kits like Tycoon 2FA and Evilginx work, and how to defend against them. ","2024-05-23T00:00:00.000Z","phishing-2-0-how-phishing-toolkits-are-evolving-with-aitm",{"items":1683},[1684],{"firstName":492,"profilePicture":1685},{"url":497},{"__typename":1675,"sys":1687,"title":1689,"synopsis":1690,"publishedDate":1691,"slug":1692,"authorsCollection":1693},{"id":1688},"234jcnJJ5Bo8cwWL54Mv4g","Analyzing a fake event campaign combining AiTM and device code phishing payloads","Push found fake registration pages for OpenAI, SpaceX, and Anthropic events, using Kali365 to phish Microsoft accounts and VoidProxy to phish Google accounts.","2026-11-05T00:00:00.000Z","ai-themed-fake-event-campaign-analysis",{"items":1694},[1695],{"firstName":492,"profilePicture":1696},{"url":497},{"__typename":1675,"sys":1698,"title":1700,"synopsis":1701,"publishedDate":1702,"slug":1703,"authorsCollection":1704},{"id":1699},"3iknT74OE9mYtsK9D0QYkA","Ranking the best anti-phishing tools and software in 2026","Your guide to enterprise phishing protection in 2026: what each anti-phishing tool focuses on, the layer it protects, and where phishing still slips through.","2026-10-12T00:00:00.000Z","ranking-the-best-anti-phishing-tools-and-software",{"items":1705},[1706],{"firstName":1707,"profilePicture":1708},"Peyton",{"url":1709},"https:\u002F\u002Fimages.ctfassets.net\u002Fy1cdw1ablpvd\u002F1GU01HXElmc07nwi89qP3b\u002F3188050420106c62e9df2ed4e4893b7f\u002F1677005177901__1_.jpeg","aitm-phishing-dom-mirroring","blog\u002Faitm-phishing-dom-mirroring",{"json":1713},{"data":1714,"content":1715,"nodeType":500},{},[1716],{"data":1717,"content":1718,"nodeType":504},{},[1719],{"data":1720,"marks":1721,"value":1722,"nodeType":508},{},[],"Today's AiTM kits fall into four classes: reverse proxy, replica page, pixel streaming, and DOM mirroring. This post explains how each one works and why attackers are shifting to DOM mirroring as their method of choice.","This post explains why attackers are shifting to DOM mirroring as their AiTM method of choice and compares it to traditional reverse proxies and replica pages.",{"id":1725,"publishedAt":1726},"62Edl8OiKEOTVjDeznwF6l","2026-11-18T11:13:49.421Z",{"items":1728},[1729],{"sys":1730,"name":1732},{"id":1731},"6A5RXS31ZQx3PwryGb1IMy","Browser-based attacks",{"items":1734},[1735,1740,1745,1750,1755,1760,1765,1770,1775,1779,1784,1789],{"sys":1736,"name":1738,"slug":1739,"tier":43},{"id":1737},"topic-aitm","AiTM phishing","aitm",{"sys":1741,"name":1743,"slug":1744,"tier":43},{"id":1742},"topic-detection-engineering","Detection engineering","detection-engineering",{"sys":1746,"name":1748,"slug":1749,"tier":43},{"id":1747},"topic-legitimate-service-abuse","Legitimate service abuse","legitimate-service-abuse",{"sys":1751,"name":1753,"slug":1754,"tier":43},{"id":1752},"topic-bec","BEC","bec",{"sys":1756,"name":1758,"slug":1759,"tier":43},{"id":1757},"topic-social-engineering","Social engineering","social-engineering",{"sys":1761,"name":1763,"slug":1764,"tier":43},{"id":1762},"topic-identity-attacks","Identity attacks","identity-attacks",{"sys":1766,"name":1768,"slug":1769,"tier":43},{"id":1767},"topic-mfa-bypass","MFA bypass","mfa-bypass",{"sys":1771,"name":1773,"slug":1774,"tier":43},{"id":1772},"topic-credential-phishing","Credential phishing","credential-phishing",{"sys":1776,"name":124,"slug":1778,"tier":26},{"id":1777},"topic-phishing","phishing",{"sys":1780,"name":1782,"slug":1783,"tier":26},{"id":1781},"topic-threat-landscape","Threat landscape","threat-landscape",{"sys":1785,"name":1787,"slug":1788,"tier":26},{"id":1786},"topic-detection-and-response","Detection & response","detection-and-response",{"sys":1790,"name":1792,"slug":1793,"tier":26},{"id":1791},"topic-browser-attacks","Browser attacks","browser-attacks","64EC7jlOEgpbFMIH66WpdD7-2fJ-aCzu3kTQlYdPaqA",{"id":1796,"extension":1665,"items":1797,"meta":2178,"stem":2179,"__hash__":2180},"blogTopics\u002Fblogtopics.json",[1798,1808,1816,1825,1831,1837,1843,1852,1861,1870,1879,1885,1893,1899,1905,1913,1922,1931,1939,1947,1953,1962,1971,1977,1986,1994,2003,2009,2018,2027,2036,2044,2053,2059,2067,2075,2084,2093,2102,2110,2118,2126,2134,2140,2148,2156,2165,2170],{"sys":1799,"faqItemsCollection":1801,"name":1803,"slug":1804,"tier":26,"intro":1805,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":1806,"hasPage":1807},{"id":1800},"topic-ai",{"items":1802},[],"AI","ai","AI is reshaping both sides of the security equation: employees adopt AI tools faster than security teams can track them, while attackers use AI to scale and automate campaigns. Shadow AI adoption may now outpace wider shadow SaaS, and attackers are already turning AI chatbot platforms into malware delivery channels. Push has researched the offensive potential of computer-using agents and now applies AI agents to its own threat hunting. This hub covers AI as risk, target, and defensive tool.",27,true,{"sys":1809,"faqItemsCollection":1811,"name":1813,"slug":1814,"tier":43,"intro":1815,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":1806,"hasPage":1807},{"id":1810},"topic-ai-attacks",{"items":1812},[],"AI attacks","ai-attacks","AI attacks run in both directions: attackers using AI to scale phishing, malware delivery, and identity attacks, and AI platforms themselves becoming the attack surface. Push has researched how computer-using agents can automate identity attacks, and has seen the poisoned tenant technique it coined used against its own employees in the wild.",{"sys":1817,"faqItemsCollection":1819,"name":1821,"slug":1822,"tier":43,"intro":1823,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":1824,"hasPage":1807},{"id":1818},"topic-ai-governance",{"items":1820},[],"AI governance","ai-governance","AI governance is how organizations set and enforce rules for workplace AI use — which tools are allowed, what data can enter them, and how to evidence it to regulators. With US, EU, and UK AI regulations converging on obligations most organizations can’t yet meet, Push’s research makes the case that enforcement starts in the browser, where AI tools are actually used.",14,{"sys":1826,"faqItemsCollection":1827,"name":1738,"slug":1739,"tier":43,"intro":1829,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":1830,"hasPage":1807},{"id":1737},{"items":1828},[],"[Adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing](https:\u002F\u002Fpushsecurity.com\u002Fsolution\u002Fstop-browser-based-attacks\u002Fadversary-in-the-middle-attacks) proxies a real login page through an attacker-controlled site, capturing credentials, MFA codes, and session tokens in real time to bypass multi-factor authentication. Push’s research into kits like Evilginx and Sneaky2FA documents how they evade URL- and signature-based detection — and why analyzing toolkit behavior in the browser catches attacks that blocklists miss.",81,{"sys":1832,"faqItemsCollection":1833,"name":1753,"slug":1754,"tier":43,"intro":1835,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":1836,"hasPage":1807},{"id":1752},{"items":1834},[],"Business email compromise (BEC) turns a hijacked mailbox into a fraud tool: attackers use mail rules, auto-forwarding, and payment redirection to steal money while staying invisible to the account owner. Alongside a first-hand case study of a BEC attack that nearly cost an engineering firm millions, Push breaks down these mailbox persistence tricks and how to detect them.",7,{"sys":1838,"faqItemsCollection":1839,"name":1792,"slug":1793,"tier":26,"intro":1841,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":1842,"hasPage":1807},{"id":1791},{"items":1840},[],"Browser attacks target users through the web pages, sessions, and extensions they rely on every day — bypassing endpoint and network defenses that never see inside the browser. Techniques like AiTM phishing kits, ClickFix-style copy-paste attacks, OAuth consent abuse, malvertising, and browser sync abuse have become a leading path to account takeover. Push researchers analyze these attacks in the wild, from infiltrating criminal phishing panels to dissecting toolkits like ConsentFix and Sneaky2FA. Use this hub to track how the techniques evolve and how to defend against them.",129,{"sys":1844,"faqItemsCollection":1846,"name":1848,"slug":1849,"tier":43,"intro":1850,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":1851,"hasPage":1807},{"id":1845},"topic-browser-extensions",{"items":1847},[],"Browser extensions","browser-extensions","Browser extensions cut both ways for security teams: malicious or compromised extensions are a growing attack vector, while an extension is also the lightest-weight way to deploy security controls into the browsers employees already use. These posts cover both sides — extension-borne risks like browser sync attacks and the limits of risk scoring, and how Push uses its extension to detect threats and block risky extensions.",38,{"sys":1853,"faqItemsCollection":1855,"name":1857,"slug":1858,"tier":26,"intro":1859,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":1860,"hasPage":1807},{"id":1854},"topic-browser-security",{"items":1856},[],"Browser security","browser-security","Work now happens in the browser, making browser security — visibility and control at the point where users meet the web — a core layer of enterprise defense. Endpoint, network, and email tools miss attacks that unfold inside the browser session, from AiTM phishing to risky extensions and shadow SaaS. Push has published extensively on choosing between enterprise browsers and browser extensions, using browser telemetry, and making the business case for browser security. Start here for both strategy and hands-on guidance.",135,{"sys":1862,"faqItemsCollection":1864,"name":1866,"slug":1867,"tier":43,"intro":1868,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":1869,"hasPage":1807},{"id":1863},"topic-casb",{"items":1865},[],"CASB","casb","Cloud access security brokers (CASBs) govern cloud app usage through API integrations and network proxies — an approach that works for sanctioned apps but struggles with the long tail of shadow SaaS employees adopt on their own. Because every SaaS signup happens in a browser, Push captures that adoption in real time at the point of login, and these posts cover what proxy-based discovery misses.",17,{"sys":1871,"faqItemsCollection":1873,"name":1875,"slug":1876,"tier":43,"intro":1877,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":1878,"hasPage":1807},{"id":1872},"topic-clickfix",{"items":1874},[],"ClickFix","clickfix","[ClickFix](https:\u002F\u002Fpushsecurity.com\u002Fsolution\u002Fstop-browser-based-attacks\u002Fclickfix-fix-variants) attacks trick users into copying and running malicious commands themselves — typically through fake CAPTCHA, error, or fix-it prompts — so malware executes without a download for security tools to scan. Push researchers track the technique’s evolution in the wild and identified the ConsentFix and InstallFix variants, which extend it to OAuth consent grants and fake install guides.",43,{"sys":1880,"faqItemsCollection":1881,"name":1773,"slug":1774,"tier":43,"intro":1883,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":1884,"hasPage":1807},{"id":1772},{"items":1882},[],"Credential phishing steals usernames and passwords through fake login pages impersonating the services employees use, handing attackers direct access to corporate accounts. Attackers don’t hack in — they log in. Push’s browser extension analyzes login pages as users actually see them, blocking cloned pages and stopping employees from entering company passwords on lookalike sites.",93,{"sys":1886,"faqItemsCollection":1888,"name":178,"slug":1890,"tier":43,"intro":1891,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":1892,"hasPage":1807},{"id":1887},"topic-credential-stuffing",{"items":1889},[],"credential-stuffing","Credential stuffing is an attack where criminals replay username-password pairs stolen from one breach against other services, exploiting password reuse to take over accounts. Major breaches have shown how far a single set of stolen credentials can travel. Push detects verified stolen credentials by comparing employee passwords against breach datasets and dark-web threat intelligence, eliminating false positives.",64,{"sys":1894,"faqItemsCollection":1895,"name":1787,"slug":1788,"tier":26,"intro":1897,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":1898,"hasPage":1807},{"id":1786},{"items":1896},[],"Detection and response is being reshaped as attacks move into the browser, where EDR, SIEM, and network tools have limited visibility. Modern phishing kits evade signature-based detection, and most malicious pages have never been seen before — so technique-level, in-browser detection matters more than known-bad indicators. Push’s work here spans high-fidelity browser telemetry, session token theft detection, and agentic threat hunting, plus practical IR guidance for compromised SaaS accounts and malicious OAuth apps. These posts cover both the philosophy and the workflows.",106,{"sys":1900,"faqItemsCollection":1901,"name":1743,"slug":1744,"tier":43,"intro":1903,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":1904,"hasPage":1807},{"id":1742},{"items":1902},[],"Detection engineering turns threat research into reliable, high-fidelity detections — and as AI accelerates the churn of attacker infrastructure, indicator-based detection is collapsing in favor of technique-level approaches. Here you’ll find teardowns of AiTM kits, ClickFix pages, and malvertising campaigns, alongside Push’s own account of building an agentic threat hunting pipeline that turns hunts into shipped detections.",45,{"sys":1906,"faqItemsCollection":1908,"name":139,"slug":1910,"tier":43,"intro":1911,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":1912,"hasPage":1807},{"id":1907},"topic-device-code-phishing",{"items":1909},[],"device-code-phishing","[Device code phishing](https:\u002F\u002Fpushsecurity.com\u002Fsolution\u002Fstop-browser-based-attacks\u002Fdevice-code-phishing) abuses the OAuth device authorization flow: attackers generate a legitimate sign-in code, trick the victim into entering it on the vendor’s real login page, and walk away with access tokens — no fake site or password capture required. Push research tracked a sharp spike in adoption during 2026 as attackers use the technique to sidestep standard access controls.",25,{"sys":1914,"faqItemsCollection":1916,"name":1918,"slug":1919,"tier":43,"intro":1920,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":1921,"hasPage":1807},{"id":1915},"topic-dlp",{"items":1917},[],"DLP","dlp","Data loss prevention (DLP) is the practice of stopping sensitive data from leaving your control — a problem that has shifted from email and endpoints to the browser, where employees move data into SaaS and AI tools. Push applies controls at that point of use, from keeping corporate credentials out of personal password managers to governing what flows into unsanctioned apps.",22,{"sys":1923,"faqItemsCollection":1925,"name":1927,"slug":1928,"tier":43,"intro":1929,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":1930,"hasPage":1807},{"id":1924},"topic-edr",{"items":1926},[],"EDR","edr","Endpoint detection and response (EDR) watches processes, files, and memory on the device — a vantage point that never sees the phishing pages, stolen sessions, and identity attacks playing out inside the browser. That’s not an EDR failure; attackers have simply moved where it can’t follow. These posts map that gap and show how Push pairs browser-level detection and response with endpoint security to close it.",30,{"sys":1932,"faqItemsCollection":1934,"name":1936,"slug":1937,"tier":43,"intro":1938,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":1824,"hasPage":1807},{"id":1933},"topic-enterprise-browser",{"items":1935},[],"Enterprise browser","enterprise-browser","An enterprise browser gives security teams visibility and control over how employees use the web. That covers the apps they sign in to, the data they move and the attacks they run into. You can get one as a full replacement browser, or as an extension that secures the browsers people already use, which is the approach Push takes.\n\nThis hub collects our rankings, comparisons and analysis of the secure enterprise browser market. Start with the [8 best secure enterprise browsers in 2026](https:\u002F\u002Fpushsecurity.com\u002Fblog\u002Franking-the-best-enterprise-browsers), or read the [browser security buyer's guide](https:\u002F\u002Fpushsecurity.com\u002Fresources\u002Fbrowser-security-buyers-guide) to choose what's right for your team.",{"sys":1940,"faqItemsCollection":1942,"name":168,"slug":1944,"tier":43,"intro":1945,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":1946,"hasPage":1807},{"id":1941},"topic-ghost-logins",{"items":1943},[],"ghost-logins","Ghost logins are overlooked authentication routes into an account — like a password login lingering behind SSO, or a forgotten secondary auth method — that attackers exploit for account takeover and persistence. Push coined the term after research showing how these forgotten login paths let attackers sidestep the MFA and SSO controls guarding an account’s primary sign-in method.",49,{"sys":1948,"faqItemsCollection":1949,"name":1763,"slug":1764,"tier":43,"intro":1951,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":1952,"hasPage":1807},{"id":1762},{"items":1950},[],"Identity attacks target user accounts rather than infrastructure — phishing credentials, stealing sessions, abusing OAuth grants — because logging in is easier than hacking in. Identity-based techniques are now the leading cause of breaches. Push’s offensive research maps these techniques continuously, coining attacks like SAMLjacking and the poisoned tenant before they appeared in the wild.",63,{"sys":1954,"faqItemsCollection":1956,"name":1958,"slug":1959,"tier":26,"intro":1960,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":1961,"hasPage":1807},{"id":1955},"topic-identity-security",{"items":1957},[],"Identity security","identity-security","Identity security is the practice of protecting workforce accounts, credentials, and sessions — the primary route attackers now use to breach organizations. Instead of hacking in, attackers log in: through phished credentials, stolen session tokens, MFA bypass, and forgotten ghost logins. Push’s research team documents these techniques continuously, from cross-IdP impersonation and SAMLjacking to analyses of major identity-driven breaches. This hub collects that research alongside practical guidance on MFA, SSO, and stopping account takeover.",155,{"sys":1963,"faqItemsCollection":1965,"name":1967,"slug":1968,"tier":43,"intro":1969,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":1970,"hasPage":1807},{"id":1964},"topic-infostealer",{"items":1966},[],"Infostealer","infostealer","Infostealers are malware built to harvest saved passwords, cookies, and session tokens from infected devices, supplying the stolen credentials behind some of the most consequential breaches of recent years. Push traces the ecosystem trading this data and checks employee passwords against threat intel feeds, flagging verified stolen credentials before attackers can log in with them.",56,{"sys":1972,"faqItemsCollection":1973,"name":1748,"slug":1749,"tier":43,"intro":1975,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":1976,"hasPage":1807},{"id":1747},{"items":1974},[],"Legitimate service abuse means staging attacks on trusted platforms — Google Ads, AI chatbot share pages, office.com links, Slack, SaaS tenants — so malicious content inherits the reputation of the service hosting it. Push research has documented the pattern repeatedly, from malvertising run through hijacked Google Ad Manager accounts to phishing links generated by Active Directory Federation Services.",31,{"sys":1978,"faqItemsCollection":1980,"name":1982,"slug":1983,"tier":43,"intro":1984,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":1985,"hasPage":1807},{"id":1979},"topic-malvertising",{"items":1981},[],"Malvertising","malvertising","Malvertising uses paid search and display ads to put phishing pages and malware in front of users, often by impersonating trusted brands at the top of Google results. Push tracks these campaigns continuously — intercepting live attacks spoofing well-known brands — and has documented how criminals hijack Google Ads accounts to fund and run them.",34,{"sys":1987,"faqItemsCollection":1989,"name":1991,"slug":1992,"tier":43,"intro":1993,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":1869,"hasPage":1807},{"id":1988},"topic-malware-delivery",{"items":1990},[],"Malware delivery","malware-delivery","Malware delivery has moved into the browser: rather than email attachments, attackers now rely on malvertising, fake install guides, and ClickFix-style copy-paste lures to get code running on endpoints. Push research on techniques like InstallFix maps the playbook, and in-browser detection of malicious copy and paste blocks these attacks before commands reach the endpoint.",{"sys":1995,"faqItemsCollection":1997,"name":1999,"slug":2000,"tier":43,"intro":2001,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":2002,"hasPage":1807},{"id":1996},"topic-mfa",{"items":1998},[],"MFA","mfa","Multi-factor authentication (MFA) requires a second proof of identity beyond a password, and it remains one of the most effective controls against account takeover. Regulators from Cyber Essentials to NYDFS now mandate it across cloud services. Push enforces MFA in the browser on third-party apps — even those with no native enforcement option — and shows security teams where coverage gaps remain.",85,{"sys":2004,"faqItemsCollection":2005,"name":1768,"slug":1769,"tier":43,"intro":2007,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":2008,"hasPage":1807},{"id":1767},{"items":2006},[],"MFA bypass covers the techniques attackers use to defeat multi-factor authentication — AiTM phishing kits, consent phishing, device code phishing, and MFA downgrade attacks among them. None of these break the second factor; they route around it. Push researchers regularly get hands-on with phishing kits like Evilginx and Sneaky2FA, analyzing how these attacks work in the wild and how they evolve.",61,{"sys":2010,"faqItemsCollection":2012,"name":2014,"slug":2015,"tier":43,"intro":2016,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":2017,"hasPage":1807},{"id":2011},"topic-non-email-phishing",{"items":2013},[],"Non-email phishing","non-email-phishing","Non-email phishing delivers malicious links through channels your secure email gateway never sees — social media messages, IM apps like Slack and Teams, search ads, and SMS. Push has intercepted live campaigns arriving via LinkedIn DMs, malvertising, and messaging platforms, which is why it detects phishing pages in the browser at the point of click, regardless of delivery channel.",54,{"sys":2019,"faqItemsCollection":2021,"name":2023,"slug":2024,"tier":43,"intro":2025,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":2026,"hasPage":1807},{"id":2020},"topic-oauth-abuse",{"items":2022},[],"OAuth abuse","oauth-abuse","OAuth abuse is attackers exploiting app-to-app authorization — consent phishing, malicious OAuth apps, stolen tokens, and device code flows — to gain persistent access to cloud tenants without touching a password or MFA prompt. Push tracks these techniques continuously and discovered ConsentFix, a browser-native attack in the wild that pairs OAuth consent phishing with a ClickFix-style prompt.",70,{"sys":2028,"faqItemsCollection":2030,"name":2032,"slug":2033,"tier":43,"intro":2034,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":2035,"hasPage":1807},{"id":2029},"topic-passkeys",{"items":2031},[],"Passkeys","passkeys","Passkeys are phishing-resistant credentials that replace passwords with cryptographic key pairs bound to a user’s device. They defeat conventional credential phishing, but attackers adapt: Push research has documented MFA downgrade, app-specific password phishing, and device code phishing being used in the wild to route around passkey-protected accounts. Deploying passkeys is step one; closing those fallback paths is step two.",23,{"sys":2037,"faqItemsCollection":2039,"name":2041,"slug":2042,"tier":43,"intro":2043,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":1830,"hasPage":1807},{"id":2038},"topic-password-security",{"items":2040},[],"Password security","password-security","Password security is the practice of keeping workforce credentials strong, unique, and out of attackers’ hands — still a frontline defense while most SaaS logins depend on passwords. Expiration policies don’t fix weak or reused passwords; visibility does. Push observes real logins in the browser to flag weak, reused, and breached passwords and guide employees to reset them on any app.",{"sys":2045,"faqItemsCollection":2047,"name":2049,"slug":2050,"tier":43,"intro":2051,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":2052,"hasPage":1807},{"id":2046},"topic-phaas",{"items":2048},[],"PhaaS","phaas","Phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) platforms sell ready-made phishing kits, hosted infrastructure, and management panels on subscription, letting low-skill criminals run MFA-bypassing campaigns at scale. Kits like Evilginx, Tycoon2FA, Sneaky2FA, FlowerStorm, and EvilTokens each add their own evasion and session-theft capabilities, and new entrants appear regularly. Push researchers continuously get hands-on with these tools — investigating attacks in the wild, reverse-engineering kit behavior, and turning that research into detections.",41,{"sys":2054,"faqItemsCollection":2055,"name":124,"slug":1778,"tier":26,"intro":2057,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":2058,"hasPage":1807},{"id":1777},{"items":2056},[],"Phishing remains the most common way attackers compromise business accounts — and it has moved far beyond suspicious emails. Modern campaigns use AiTM toolkits that bypass MFA, consent phishing against OAuth, device code phishing, and lures delivered through malvertising, LinkedIn, and Slack. Push detects and blocks these attacks in the browser, and its researchers publish teardowns of live campaigns and kits like Evilginx and Sneaky2FA. Read on for how phishing actually works today and what stops it.",98,{"sys":2060,"faqItemsCollection":2062,"name":2064,"slug":2065,"tier":43,"intro":2066,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":1930,"hasPage":1807},{"id":2061},"topic-public-breach",{"items":2063},[],"Public breach","public-breach","Public breaches are the disclosed incidents that show how attacks actually unfold once the headlines fade. Push’s breach analyses keep finding identity at the entry point: stolen credentials, OAuth abuse, and missing MFA recur across the incidents analyzed here.",{"sys":2068,"faqItemsCollection":2070,"name":2072,"slug":2073,"tier":43,"intro":2074,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":1824,"hasPage":1807},{"id":2069},"topic-ransomware",{"items":2071},[],"Ransomware","ransomware","Ransomware attacks increasingly begin with an identity, not an exploit: stolen credentials, MFA bypass, and help desk scams give operators their initial foothold. The analysis here follows that front end of the kill chain — how identity compromise leads to ransomware deployment, and the breaches driving regulators toward tighter MFA requirements.",{"sys":2076,"faqItemsCollection":2078,"name":2080,"slug":2081,"tier":26,"intro":2082,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":2083,"hasPage":1807},{"id":2077},"topic-saas-security",{"items":2079},[],"SaaS security","saas-security","SaaS security means protecting the sprawl of cloud apps, accounts, and integrations your employees adopt — often without IT ever knowing. Shadow SaaS, risky OAuth grants, ghost logins, and unmanaged third-party access create attack paths traditional controls can’t see, as recent high-profile breaches have demonstrated. Building on the original SaaS attack matrix, Push continues to map SaaS-native attack techniques alongside practical guides for discovering and securing unsanctioned apps, and this hub gathers all of it.",100,{"sys":2085,"faqItemsCollection":2087,"name":2089,"slug":2090,"tier":43,"intro":2091,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":2092,"hasPage":1807},{"id":2086},"topic-security-training",{"items":2088},[],"Security training","security-training","Security training aims to teach employees to recognize and avoid attacks — yet modern phishing routinely fools even seasoned security professionals. Push argues that training budgets work harder as real-time, in-browser intervention: guardrails and warnings at the moment of risk, rather than lessons employees must recall under pressure.",5,{"sys":2094,"faqItemsCollection":2096,"name":2098,"slug":2099,"tier":43,"intro":2100,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":2101,"hasPage":1807},{"id":2095},"topic-seo-poisoning",{"items":2097},[],"SEO poisoning","seo-poisoning","SEO poisoning manipulates search engine results so malicious pages rank prominently for the software, tools, or services users are actively searching for, turning a routine search into an infection vector. It often pairs with malvertising and ClickFix-style payloads — Push has documented attackers abusing shared pages on legitimate AI chatbot domains to deliver malware from trusted infrastructure.",8,{"sys":2103,"faqItemsCollection":2105,"name":183,"slug":2107,"tier":43,"intro":2108,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":2109,"hasPage":1807},{"id":2104},"topic-session-hijacking",{"items":2106},[],"session-hijacking","[Session hijacking](https:\u002F\u002Fpushsecurity.com\u002Fsolution\u002Fstop-browser-based-attacks\u002Fsession-hijacking) is the theft of an authenticated session — usually via stolen session cookies or tokens — letting attackers walk past passwords and MFA into a live account. AiTM phishing kits and infostealers have made it a mainstream attack technique across both criminal and targeted intrusions. Push’s browser agent detects session token theft by adding telemetry to the user agent string, creating a high-fidelity signal for security teams.",78,{"sys":2111,"faqItemsCollection":2113,"name":2115,"slug":2116,"tier":43,"intro":2117,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":2035,"hasPage":1807},{"id":2112},"topic-shadow-ai",{"items":2114},[],"Shadow AI","shadow-ai","Shadow AI is employees’ unsanctioned use of AI tools at work, putting corporate data into chatbots and assistants that security teams never approved and can’t see. Push’s own browser telemetry shows AI adoption acting as a force multiplier for shadow IT — potentially now outscaling shadow SaaS — and this hub tracks that research, real-world breach examples, and practical controls.",{"sys":2119,"faqItemsCollection":2121,"name":2123,"slug":2124,"tier":43,"intro":2125,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":2109,"hasPage":1807},{"id":2120},"topic-shadow-saas",{"items":2122},[],"Shadow SaaS","shadow-saas","Shadow SaaS is the cloud applications employees adopt for work without IT approval, each one creating unmanaged accounts, identities, and data outside your security controls. Push covers the problem end to end — from browser-based SaaS discovery to in-browser app banners and MFA enforcement — alongside breach analyses that show where unmanaged accounts lead.",{"sys":2127,"faqItemsCollection":2129,"name":2131,"slug":2132,"tier":43,"intro":2133,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":1921,"hasPage":1807},{"id":2128},"topic-siem",{"items":2130},[],"SIEM","siem","A SIEM is only as good as the telemetry feeding it, and most log sources never see what happens inside the browser — where phishing, session token theft, and account takeover actually play out. Push streams browser-level detections and identity telemetry into SIEMs, and these posts show how that data improves detection fidelity and cuts alert fatigue.",{"sys":2135,"faqItemsCollection":2136,"name":1758,"slug":1759,"tier":43,"intro":2138,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":2139,"hasPage":1807},{"id":1757},{"items":2137},[],"Social engineering is the manipulation of people — through phishing pages, help desk impersonation, vishing calls, and poisoned tenant invites — into handing over access that no exploit could take. Coverage here tracks how threat actors run these plays — drawing on Push’s ongoing investigation of live phishing infrastructure and criminal tooling.",67,{"sys":2141,"faqItemsCollection":2143,"name":2145,"slug":2146,"tier":26,"intro":2147,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":2092,"hasPage":1807},{"id":2142},"topic-supply-chain-security",{"items":2144},[],"Supply chain security","supply-chain-security","Supply chain security extends beyond your own perimeter to the vendors, platforms, and browser extensions your organization depends on. A compromised third party can hand attackers legitimate access — as recent campaigns against SaaS providers have shown. Push’s research examines the browser-extension supply chain in particular: why extension risk scores fail to predict compromise, and how developers can harden extensions against takeover. These posts frame supply chain risk through a browser and identity lens.",{"sys":2149,"faqItemsCollection":2151,"name":2153,"slug":2154,"tier":43,"intro":2155,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":2035,"hasPage":1807},{"id":2150},"topic-swg",{"items":2152},[],"SWG","swg","A secure web gateway (SWG) filters and inspects web traffic in transit, sitting in the network path between users and the internet. That position shows you the packet but not the session: Push’s research on AitM phishing kits documents how attackers break the signatures proxies rely on, and these posts explain why phishing detection is moving from the network path into the browser itself.",{"sys":2157,"faqItemsCollection":2159,"name":2161,"slug":2162,"tier":43,"intro":2163,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":2164,"hasPage":1807},{"id":2158},"topic-third-party-risk",{"items":2160},[],"Third-party risk","third-party-risk","Third-party risk is the exposure your organization inherits from vendors, SaaS providers, and integrations that hold your data or access your tenants — a chain now extended one employee sign-up at a time. This hub collects Push’s breach analyses and guides for assessing OAuth integrations, managing browser extensions, and responding when a supplier is compromised.",50,{"sys":2166,"faqItemsCollection":2167,"name":1782,"slug":1783,"tier":26,"intro":2169,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":2017,"hasPage":1807},{"id":1781},{"items":2168},[],"The enterprise threat landscape is now defined by identity attacks: criminals log in with phished, stolen, or stuffed credentials rather than breaking infrastructure. Threat actors keep proving how effective help desk scams, MFA bypass, and session theft are against well-defended organizations. Drawing on breach analyses, annual phishing trend reviews, and in-the-wild campaign tracking, Push documents how attacker TTPs are shifting. This hub is where to follow those changes.",{"sys":2171,"faqItemsCollection":2173,"name":2175,"slug":2176,"tier":43,"intro":2177,"faqTitle":30,"postCount":1869,"hasPage":1807},{"id":2172},"topic-vishing",{"items":2174},[],"Vishing","vishing","Vishing — voice phishing — uses phone calls to impersonate IT support, help desks, or employees, talking targets into password resets, MFA approvals, or opening attacker-controlled pages. Threat actors now routinely pair calls with AiTM phishing to hijack SSO accounts, a chain Push has analyzed across campaigns targeting hundreds of organizations.",{},"blogtopics","kd6J30v35RzlYTlrnvIH04yTGgihkQF32pny5DwjjPQ",1795000638023]